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ABSTRACT 
HADZA HUNTER-GATHERERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN 
COOPERATION: EVIDENCE AGAINST PARTNER CHOICE MODELS 
Kristopher M. Smith 
Coren L. Apicella 
Human cooperation is exceptional in the animal kingdom, and explaining its evolution is 
a puzzle. One hypothesis is that the ability to track others’ reputations and to choose our 
cooperative partners created biological markets, and competition within these markets 
selected for cooperators. Here, I test this hypothesis from the Hadza of Tanzania, one of 
the last remaining foraging populations. In Chapter 1, I use longitudinal data tracking 
cooperation in an economic game and residence patterns. In every year, contribution 
levels to the public good are similar within residence camps, fulfilling a necessary 
condition for the evolution of cooperation. However, cooperators in previous years were 
not more likely to live with cooperators in future years. Further, at the individual level, 
previous contributions did not predict future contributions. In Chapters 2 and 3, I use data 
from a ranking task in which Hadza ranked their campmates on character traits, hunting 
ability, and who they would like to live with in the future. In Chapter 2, I examine 
whether Hadza agree on perceptions of moral character. The Hadza disagree on which of 
their campmates exhibit moral character. The Hadza do agree though on what traits (e.g., 
generosity and hard work) contribute to overall moral character. These results indicate 
that the Hadza use similar criteria for evaluating moral character but do not agree on who 
exhibits these traits. The lack of agreement on perceptions of moral character may be due 
to the lack of stable moral dispositions among the Hadza. Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine 
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which traits the Hadza prefer when choosing potential campmates. I find that the Hadza 
have only weak preferences to live with campmates that exhibit characters traits, and 
instead have stronger preferences to live with men who are better hunters. Further, there 
is no evidence that being a preferred campmate results in any benefits to one’s 
reproductive success, further undermining partner choice theories. Together, these results 
indicate that partner choice and other reputation-based strategies do not maintain 
cooperation among the Hadza, and more broadly, suggests that such mechanisms were 
not responsible for the evolution of human cooperation.  
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INTRODUCTION   
Human cooperation differs from cooperation in other species in scope and scale. 
Whereas non-human animals cooperate almost exclusively with kin (Hamilton, 1964) or 
in dyads between known individuals (Trivers, 1971), humans regularly cooperate in 
groups with unrelated strangers. For example, people recycle, donate blood, tip servers, 
and vote. How humans evolved this propensity to cooperate is a puzzle to evolutionary 
biologists, and attempts to solve the puzzle have led to a dizzying array of proposed 
explanations (Rand & Nowak, 2013). What is needed then is not another explanation for 
the evolution of human cooperation, but data to test the already existing explanations.  
One common and necessary element of the different explanations for human 
cooperation is positive phenotypic assortment. That is, cooperation must cluster, such that 
the benefits of cooperation preferentially flow to other cooperators (Apicella & Silk, 
2019; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; Nowak, 2006; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997). When 
cooperators cluster, they avoid costly exploitation from freeriders and the benefits of 
mutual cooperation offsets the cost of helping other. The variety of proposed 
explanations for human cooperation simply describe different mechanisms that lead to 
positive phenotypic assortment.  
The different mechanisms proposed to generate assortment on cooperation can be 
categorized into two broad classes. The first class is behavioral change mechanisms, 
which generate assortment by changing the behavior of others. This includes mechanisms 
such as social and cultural learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1982, 2009), social contagion in 
networks (Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Rand, Nowak, Fowler, & Christakis, 2011), 
punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis, 2000), or even a combination of 
2 
 
punishment and social learning (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich & Boyd, 2001). 
Through these mechanisms, cooperators can change the behavior defectors, allowing for 
cooperation to cluster. Many of these mechanisms though are costly for cooperators, and 
often creates a second-order cooperative dilemma. To solve this problem, theorists 
often—though not always—invoke group selection and gene-culture co-evolution as 
other necessary mechanisms to explain human cooperation (Henrich, 2004).  
The second class of mechanisms proposed to generate assortment is reputation-
based mechanisms. These are mechanisms in which people track the reputation of others 
and condition their own behavior on others’ reputation. This can include whether to 
cooperate or defect on another person, such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; 
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), or whether to even interact with a person at all, such as 
partner choice models (Aktipis, 2011; Barclay, 2013; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013). 
Further, partner choice can create a biological market (Barclay, 2016a; Noë & 
Hammerstein, 1994), in which cooperative partners compete for access to other partners. 
This can lead to increased cooperation (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006) and further clustering of cooperators. These mechanisms are also generally 
assumed to be low-cost in a mobile organism, such as humans, and do not require group 
selection. As such, skeptics of group selection (Pinker, 2015), argue these mechanisms 
are more plausible than many of the proposed behavioral change mechanisms.  
In this dissertation, I examine whether partner choice maintains cooperation in the 
Hadza of Tanzania, one of the last remaining groups of hunter-gatherers (Marlowe, 
2010). I focus on partner choice for three reasons. First, partner choice has become 
increasingly popular among researchers, most notably in moral psychology. The problem 
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of evaluating and choosing potential partners is thought to be at the heart of many moral 
phenomena, including evaluations of moral character (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016; 
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), the role of mental states in moral judgments 
(Young & Tsoi, 2013), moral licensing (Barclay, 2016a), deontological moral judgments 
(Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018), fairness (Baumard et al., 2013), among 
others. Second, and related to the previous point, partner choice is well supported in 
Western populations. Finally, partner choice seems particularly relevant to hunter-
gatherers. Hunter-gatherers are nomadic with fluid residence patterns, such that they have 
regular opportunities to choose new partners. And because of their harsh environment, 
they depend on each other to cooperate in a number of domains, including food sharing, 
protection, and childcare (Apicella & Crittenden, 2016), so that the problem of deciding 
who to cooperate with has important consequences for hunter-gatherers.  
Studying cooperation in hunter-gatherers, and especially Hadza, gives some 
insight into its evolution. For most of our evolutionary history, human ancestors lived as 
hunter-gatherer, and though contemporary hunter-gatherers are surely different from 
ancestral humans, their lifestyle and ecologies better approximate ancestral conditions 
than do university students. At minimum, we can start to understand the conditions under 
which partner choice may be a viable mechanism for maintaining cooperation.  
One concern about studying contemporary hunter-gatherers is representativeness; 
contemporary foragers live in a variety of environments, from dry deserts in Africa, to 
lush rainforests in South America, and even to the extreme cold of the Arctic, and one 
group is not representative of all foragers. However, on a number of demographic and 
ecological variables, including caloric intake, number of children born, mortality rates, 
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and others, the Hadza are at or near the median value (Marlowe, 2010), so they are at 
least not outliers among foragers.  
I look at three key prediction that follow from the partner choice theory of 
cooperation. First, people should prefer to live with more cooperative individuals. 
Chapters 1 and 3 examine this assumption using behavioral data from an economic game 
and directly eliciting preferences using a ranking task. Second, people must have stable 
cooperative or moral dispositions such that future cooperative behavior can be predicted 
from previous cooperative behavior – if not, then choosing a cooperative partner now 
does not guarantee that partner will be cooperative in the future. Chapter 1 uses 
longitudinal data from an economic game to examine this assumption, and Chapter 2 
corroborates this result using independent observer rankings. Finally, for the trait to 
evolve, there must be a benefit to being a preferred partner that offsets the cost of 
cultivating a reputation as a cooperator. Chapter 3 examines the correlation between 
being a preferred campmate and reproductive success to test whether being a desirable 
social partner improves fitness.  
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CHAPTER 1: HUNTER-GATHERERS MAINTAIN ASSORTAVITY IN 
COOPERATION DESPITE HIGH-LEVELS OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGE AND 
MIXING 
Widespread cooperation is a defining feature of human societies from hunter-gatherer 
bands to nation states. But explaining its evolution remains a challenge. While positive 
assortment of cooperators is recognized as a basic requirement for the evolution of 
cooperation, the mechanisms governing assortment are debated. Moreover, the social 
structure of modern hunter-gatherers, characterized by high mobility, residential mixing 
and low genetic relatedness, undermine assortment and add to the puzzle of how 
cooperation evolved. Here, we analyze four years of data (2010, 2013, 2014, 2016) 
tracking residence and levels of cooperation elicited from a public goods game in Hadza 
hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Data were collected from 56 camps, comprising 383 unique 
individuals, 137 of whom we have data for two or more years. Despite significant 
residential mixing, we observe a robust pattern of assortment necessary for cooperation to 
evolve: In every year, Hadza camps exhibit high between-camp and low within-camp 
variation in cooperation. We find little evidence that cooperative behavior within 
individuals is stable over time or that similarity in cooperation between dyads predicts 
their future cohabitation. Both sets of findings are inconsistent with models that assume 
stable cooperative and selfish types, including partner choice models. Consistent with 
social norms, culture, and reciprocity theories, the strongest predictor of an individual’s 
level of cooperation is the mean cooperation of their current campmates. These findings 
underscore the adaptive nature of human cooperation – particularly its responsiveness to 
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social contexts – as a feature important in generating the assortment necessary for 
cooperation to evolve. 
Introduction 
The scope and scale by which we help one another, including cooperative acts 
with those who bear no genetic relation to us, is considered a hallmark of being human. 
And yet, this emblematic feature of our humanity has challenged scientific thinking 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Silk & Boyd, 2010). How can 
natural selection favor costly cooperation in the face of possible exploitation by 
defectors? Biologists have proposed multiple theoretical models to explain cooperation, 
but there is little evidence on what theories actually explain human behavior in 
evolutionarily-relevant settings. To understand this, we analyze data on cooperation and 
migration patterns in a hunter-gatherer population over a six-year period. Crucially, the 
data contain detailed information about how individual cooperative behavior persists, and 
how cooperators sort across time and space – vital elements that tease apart the most 
prominent theoretical models. And the presence of positive assortment of cooperators in 
space is a fundamental requirement of these models (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; Nowak, 
Tarnita, & Antal, 2010).  
Current hunter-gatherers live in dynamic fission-fusion societies with substantial 
inter-group mixing and consequently, low within-group relatedness (Hill et al., 2011). 
This mobility poses a challenge to assortment. Common descent, where individuals 
preferentially interact with kin (Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocity, where individuals limit 
their cooperation to known reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) can generate assortment, but 
social mobility undermines it by decreasing relatedness among group members and 
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allowing cooperative groups to be invaded by free-riders or “rovers” (Dugatkin & 
Wilson, 1991; Enquist & Leimar, 1993). As such, these classic models fall short in 
explaining how cooperation evolved in early humans under these presumed social 
dynamics.  
For this reason, three additional classes of theoretical models explaining 
cooperation and assortment have been emphasized. In models of biological markets 
involving partner choice, individuals compete for the most cooperative partners and the 
most cooperative choose each other (Barclay, 2016a). In models involving conditional 
strategies that respond to group-level behaviors, such as generalized reciprocity (Pfeiffer, 
Rutte, Killingback, Taborsky, & Bonhoeffer, 2005) and/or the switching of groups 
(Aktipis, 2011), cooperation can stabilize when the groups are small (Pfeiffer et al., 
2005). In models of gene-culture co-evolution, culturally evolving social norms, 
supported by an underlying norm-psychology, can generate within-group similarity and 
between-group differences in cooperation (Chudek & Henrich, 2011).  
While nearly all models involve some degree of behavioral flexibility such that an 
individual’s level of cooperation is contingent on the social environment, partner choice 
models assume that individuals have stable traits, often genetically determined, on which 
the choice of partners is based (Aktipis, 2011; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; J. M. 
McNamara, Barta, Fromhage, & Houston, 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). In these 
models, individuals can leave current partners or reject prospective partners based on 
their observations and past interactions. The real-world applications of these models 
hinge on the existence of trait-like differences in cooperativeness. Yet, few studies have 
examined longitudinal stability in cooperativeness in humans (Peysakhovich, Nowak, & 
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Rand, 2014; Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2012), and none have examined it in natural 
settings between members of existing social groups who know each other well.  
To tease apart these existing theories, we study cooperation in an extant hunter-
gatherer population – the Hadza of Tanzania – who provide an important test case for 
evolutionary models of cooperation. Their daily life is marked by widespread sharing of 
food, labor, and childcare and their lifeways more closely approximate pre-Neolithic 
populations compared to samples drawn from Western Educated Industrialized Rich and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  
Method 
Population 
The Hadza are nomadic foragers occupying the Lake Eyasi basin within the Great 
Rift Valley in Northern Tanzania. They sleep outside under the stars or in makeshift huts 
constructed of grass and trees. Approximately 1,000 individuals identify as Hadza, but 
only 200-300 individuals obtain the majority of their calories by hunting and gathering. It 
is this latter group that is the focus of this research. 
Men hunt birds and mammals using bows and poison-tipped arrows and collect 
honey. Women gather plant foods including baobab fruit, berries, and tubers. Food is 
shared widely within camps, especially big game but producers of the food can channel 
the food in ways that benefit their kin (Wood & Marlowe, 2013). Childcare is also shared 
(Crittenden & Marlowe, 2008). 
  The Hadza live in temporary camps that average about 30 individuals. Camps 
generally consist of several unrelated nuclear families. Relatedness within camps is low 
with primary kin comprising, on average, 1.43 and 1.93 of men and women’s campmates 
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respectively (Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014). Typical of most 
contemporary hunter-gatherers, residence patterns are fluid and are best described as 
fission-fusion grouping (Marlowe, 2010). Camps can merge or split. Individuals too, can 
freely relocate to new camps. Every 4-8 weeks entire camps shift location usually in 
response to resource availability. Because the Hadza have few capital goods and personal 
possessions, the physical costs associated with moving remain low.  
While there is striking diversity among forager societies, it is thought that the 
social, economic and political arrangements of the Hadza are similar to other hunter-
gatherer societies. A study of hunter-gatherer social life using ethnographic data from 
437 past and present foraging societies found that the vast majority of forager societies, 
including the Hadza, live in small groups, practice central place foraging and food 
sharing (Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza also fall at or near the median value on a variety of 
key demographic traits such as the percentage of calories contributed to the diet by men 
and women, infant mortality rate, fertility rate, inter-birth intervals and so on (Marlowe, 
2010). Thus, apart from the fact the Hadza still maintain a subsistence lifestyle, there is 
good reason to believe that they are not outliers in other major respects.  
 Ethno-tourism, which largely began about 10-15 years ago has had the largest 
impact on Hadza life. And tourists visiting the Hadza continue to rise each year. While 
tourists can now be found in every region of Hadzaland, the vast majority of visits take 
place in camps on the north-eastern side of Lake Eyasi, close to the village Mangola, due 
to its proximity to paved roads that lead to Arusha and safari parks (Figure 1.1). Tours 
usually last a couple of hours and culminate with a cash payment to the camp which then 
the Hadza can spend in the village.  
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 The Hadza have been described as having little belief in omniscient, moralizing 
gods (Apicella, 2018; Marlowe, 2010) but they do engage in a number of important 
rituals including a sacred epeme dance and meat-eating rituals (Marlowe, 2010). These 
rituals are thought to bond participants to one another (Hill et al., 2014). 
Sample 
Across years, we visited 56 Hadza camps collecting data from 383 unique 
individuals. For 137 participants, we have data from at least two years; Table 1.1 presents 
the samples sizes for each and the number of participants in multiple years. The mean age 
was similar across the years, ranging from 37 to 40 and women comprised 51%, 42%, 
49% and 46% of the sample in 2010, 2013, 2014, and 2016, respectively; Table 1.2 
presents further summary statistics of the demographic variables.  
11 
 
Table 1.1. Sample Sizes Within and Across Years 
Year 2010 2013 2014 2016 
2010 191 46 69 42 
2013  99 57 31 
2014   170 40 
2016    127 
Note. Total number of participants in each year on the diagonal. Other cells indicate 
number of participants in both years. 
 
Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables in Each Year 
Measure 2010 2013 2014 2016 
Males n = 94 n = 57 n = 86 n = 58 
Married n = 152 n = 76 n = 130 n = 90 
Age 37.1 (11.0) 40.0 (12.9) 39.6 (13.4) 37.6 (14.6) 
Number of living 
children 
3.1 (2.3) 3.3 (2.4) 3.5 (2.6) 3.2 (2.6) 
Near market n = 106 n = 53 n = 63 n = 37 
Close relationships 0.12 (0.12)   0.14 (0.16) 
Formal education  1.4 (2.7)  1.2 (2.5) 
Household size  4.2 (2.2)  2.7 (2.0) 
Food concern for the 
next month 
 n = 56   
Food concern for the 
next year 
 n = 53   
Trade  0.5 (0.8)   
Note. For descriptive statistics, values are counts or mean (standard deviation in 
parentheses) for that variable in each year.  
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Data collection 
Data was collected in four separate years – usually during the dry season – over a 
six-year period (2010, Aug/Sept; 2013, July; 2014, Oct/Nov; 2016, Aug/Sept). Data 
collection was supervised by different authors in different years: (CLA in 2010, 2013; IM 
in 2014 and KMS in 2016). In each year, camps were visited using snowball sampling. 
After establishing contact with the first camp, Hadza would direct the researchers to the 
next nearest camp. GPS coordinates were recorded for all camps in each year, with the 
exception of 2016 when the GPS receiver met an unfortunate end. Nevertheless, we were 
able to divide the camps in 2016 into market and nonmarket groups based on their 
general proximity to the village (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1. Map of camp locations and mean contributions. Circles represent the camps 
visited colored by year of data collection. The size of the point signifies the mean public 
goods contribution in the camp. GPS data are not available in 2016 due to missing 
equipment. The camps in 2016 are grouped by whether they were located in the market 
vs non-market region, but their placement is otherwise random.   
 
Public goods game 
We used a public goods game as our measure of cooperation. This game is 
directly applicable to hunter-gatherer life where collective action problems are faced by 
groups on a daily basis. We used a food item instead of money since explanations for the 
evolution of cooperation have highlighted the importance of food sharing (Jaeggi & van 
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Schaik, 2011; Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; Kaplan et al., 1985). The methods for the public 
goods game elicitation in the Hadza has been described previously (Apicella, Marlowe, 
Fowler, & Christakis, 2012).   
Cooperation was elicited by examining participants’ voluntary contributions in a 
public goods game played with adult members of their camp. All games were conducted 
in Swahili and inside a vehicle for privacy. All adults in each camp were invited to 
participate with the exception of the very elderly and infirm. In 2010, 2013 and 2014 the 
game was played on the last day the researcher was in camp in order to limit possible 
discussion. Participants were also told that the game was secret. Since decisions were 
made in private, any assertions made by participants regarding their decision need not be 
truthful. In 2016, the game was played throughout the researcher’s stay in the camp. 
Importantly, we find the same pattern of results.  
Participants were endowed with four straws of 100% pure honey (2010, 
Honeystix, GloryBee foods Inc. 2013, 2014, Honey Stix, Stakich Inc.), a prized food of 
the Hadza (Berbesque & Marlowe, 2009). Each honey stick contains roughly 15 calories. 
Participants then faced the decision of how to divide their honey sticks into a private 
account and a public account. Participants were told that the goods would be distributed 
evenly with all other adult camp members who also played the game. They were 
instructed that they could keep any amount from 0-4 sticks of the honey or donate them 
to the public goods by inserting them into an opaque cardboard box with an opening at 
the top. Participants were told that for every stick of honey they donated, the researcher 
would donate an additional 3 sticks of honey to the public pot, and that, after all adult 
campmates played the game, the honey would be divided equally among them. 
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Participants were also told that they would receive their undonated honey at the same 
time as the public honey was distributed to avoid confounding generosity with patience 
and that their decisions would be secret. Before participants made their decision, the 
researcher simulated all their possible choices so that subjects were shown the additional 
amount of honey added to the box for each decision. The Hadza have had experience 
playing various games to measure economic (e.g. endowment effect and risk) and social 
preferences (e.g. dictator, ultimatum, third-party punishment) with researchers over the 
last decade (Apicella, Azevedo, Christakis, & Fowler, 2014; Henrich, 2006; Henrich et 
al., 2001; Marlowe, 2004a).  
Additional control variables 
Basic Demographics. Age, marital status, spouse’s names and reproductive 
histories were recorded each year.  
Education. Participants were asked the number of years that they attended school 
in 2013 and 2016.  
Household size. We asked participants the number of other individuals living in 
their household in 2013 and 2016. This typically includes children and spouse and 
occasionally other close family members.  
Concerns about food. In 2013, participants were asked two forced choice 
questions about whether they were worried there would be enough food for their family 
in 1) over the next month or 2) over the year. Participants answered yes or no to both 
questions, such that a “yes” indicated participants were worried about having enough 
food.  
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Trade. In 2013, participants were asked to estimate how many days out of the past 
seven they personally went to a market or trade center to buy or sell something.  
Risk. In 2013, 76 of the participants who played the public good game also 
completed a task measuring risk preferences. Participants were endowed with 4 honey 
sticks and then asked to bet any number of those sticks, with a 50/50 chance of doubling 
the bet or losing all gambled honey sticks.  
Close Relationships in Camp. In 2010 and 2016, we asked participants to provide 
the names of their biological parents, which allowed us to identify primary kin (full 
siblingships and parent-child relationships) living together. For each individual, we then 
calculated the proportion of their campmates that were primary kin or a spouse as a 
measure of “close relationships.”  
Time of Day. In 2010, 2013, and 2014, the public goods game was played after all 
other data were collected and in a short time period. Time was not recorded in these three 
sample years. In 2016, the public goods game was played throughout the study period so 
that the time the game was played varied within camps. Time of day was categorized into 
three periods: morning if the game was played between 8:00 and 12:00, afternoon if 
played between 12:00 and 16:00, and evening if played between 16:00 and 18:00. 
Quantification and statistical analysis 
Software 
All analyses were conducted in R. For data manipulation, we used the tidyverse 
(Wickham, 2017b), magrittr (Bache & Wickham, 2014), and dplyr (Wickham, 2011) 
packages. For regression analyses with robust standard errors, we used the lmtest (Zeileis 
& Hothorn, 2002), multiwayvcov (Graham, Arai, & Hagströmer, 2016) and sandwich 
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(Zeileis, 2004) packages. For visualizations, we used the ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009), 
scales (Wickham, 2017a), gridExtra (Baptiste, 2017), GGally (Schloerke et al., 2017), 
RColorBrewer (Neuwirth, 2014), ggmap (Kahle & Wickham, 2013), geosphere 
(Hijmans, 2017), network (Butts, 2008), sna (Butts, 2016), and igraph (Csardi & Nepusz, 
2006) packages. 
Variance in public good contributions 
To test if public goods contributions clustered within camps, we measured 
variance between camps and variance within camps in public goods contributions. 
Variance between camps was the variance in camp mean contributions between camps, 
and variance within camps was the mean variance within each camp between individuals 
in public goods contributions. For each year, we then simulated the population 
distribution of these values. Public goods contributions were randomly re-assigned 
without replacement within the population structure. For each run, the variance between 
and within camps in public goods contributions was saved. The actual variances were 
compared to the distribution of simulated variances; if the actual variances fell within the 
extreme tales of the distribution (2.5% or 97.5%) the variances were determined to be 
significantly different from chance. We also computed FST values for each simulation run 
and the observed value by dividing between-camp variance by total variance in public 
goods contributions. 
Regression analyses 
For regression analyses that did not involve variables from previous years, all 
observations in 2010, 2013, 2014, and 2016 were used. All models had robust standard 
errors clustered on the individual. For models that include mean camp public goods 
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contribution, we calculated for everyone the mean of other camp members’ contribution 
such that an individual’s mean camp public goods contribution did not include ego’s own 
contribution. For these analyses, robust standard errors were also clustered on the camp. 
For regression analyses that involved variables from previous years, observations in 
2013, 2014, and 2016 were included only if the individual was in the previous sample 
year. For these analyses, robust standard errors were clustered on the individual, and if 
the analysis include mean camp public goods contribution, they were clustered on the 
camp as well. 
Analysis of dyads living together in future years 
We constructed a dataset of dyads to analyze who lives with whom in each year. 
To do this, we went through 2010, 2013, and 2014 and for each individual i in the sample 
at time t and time t + 1, we went through each individual j at time t and recorded whether 
i and j lived in the same camp at time t, at time t + 1, and their similarity in public goods 
contributions at time t, as well as their similarity on demographic variables at time t. 
Similarity scores were calculated by finding the absolute value of the difference between 
i and j on the variable and multiplying that value by -1 so that greater values indicate 
more similarity on the variable. We used a binary logistic regression and regressed 
whether i and j lived together at time t + 1 on the other variables with robust standard 
errors clustered on dyads. 
Results 
Cooperators cluster in camps each year 
We first tested if individuals with similar public goods contributions cluster 
within camps each year. We compared the observed variance in public goods 
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contributions with variance from 1,000 simulations. The simulations randomized 
participants and their contribution to different camps, but kept the population structure 
fixed (Apicella et al., 2012). For each simulation and the actual data, we measured the 
mean variance in public goods contributions between participants within each camp 
(within-camp variance) and the variance in mean camp public goods contributions across 
all camps (between-camp variance). In each year, less variance was observed within-
camps and more variance was observed between-camps than expected in a random 
population (p < 0.05, Figure 1.2). The 2010 results have been previously reported 
(Apicella et al., 2012). The long-term data indicate that assortment is a consistent feature 
of hunter-gatherer life, year after year.  
 
Figure 1.2. Difference between actual and simulated variance within and between 
residence camps in public goods contributions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
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We also analyzed between-group variation by computing an FST statistic for each 
year. FST typically quantifies the genetic differentiation between populations, but can be 
used to quantify between-group variation in cultural traits (Bell, Richerson, & Mcelreath, 
2009). FST is useful to consider here because if FST is large enough, then individually-
deleterious but group-beneficial behaviors can evolve (Price, 1972). In 2010, 2013, 2014, 
and 2016, FST = 0.26, 0.33, 0.24, and 0.39, respectively, and in every year was greater 
than expected in a random population, p < 0.05 (see Figure 1.3). These values are higher 
than observed genetic differentiation between nation-states, and are more similar to 
estimates of cultural differentiation between populations (Bell et al., 2009). 
We examined whether this assortment was specific to cooperative decision-
making or if other economic decision-making, specifically risk preferences, showed 
similar assortment. Using the risk preference data from 2013, we again simulated the 
between-camp and within-camp variance of risk preferences in a random population. The 
observed FST = 0.35 was greater than expected in a random population, 95% FST = 0.26. 
Moreover, contributions in the public good and honey sticks gambled were correlated, r 
(74) = 0.28, p = 0.015. We tested if cooperation remained clustered when controlling for 
risk preferences; again, the observed FST = 0.28 for contributions to the public good 
controlling for risk preference was greater than expected in a random population, 95% 
FST = 0.26. Finally, we also tested if risk preferences remained clustered within camps 
when controlling for contributions to the public good. They did; the observed FST = 0.33 
for risk preferences controlling for contributions to the public good was greater than 
expected in a random population, 95% FST = 0.27. That is, cooperation and risk were both 
independently clustered within camps.  
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Figure 1.3. Simulated and observed FST values for public good contributions. We 
simulated and computed FST values of PG contributions for a random population for each 
year. The dashed line indicates where 95% of the simulated values fall below, and the 
solid line indicates the observed FST values.  
 
The observed assortment on cooperation is remarkable because the Hadza, like 
other hunter-gatherers, have flexible living arrangements and high rates of migration (Hill 
et al., 2011, 2014). We too observe high rates of residential change. We calculated for 
each person the proportion of campmates at time t that lived in same camp with the 
individual at time t + 1. The mean proportion of repeated campmates was 21.9%. While 
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camp residence changes yearly, we still see public goods contributions clustering within 
camps each year. 
No dispositional types or preference for cooperators 
Assortment provides an overall solution to the problem of cooperation, but the 
mechanisms responsible for it are debated. One mechanism we explore is partner choice, 
where cooperation is sustained because people choose to interact with cooperators and 
the most cooperative choose each other (Barclay, 2016a). Partner choice models often 
assume that individuals have a stable, sometimes genetically determined, level of 
cooperation and individuals choose and reject partners based on this (Eshel & Cavalli-
Sforza, 1982; J. M. McNamara et al., 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). Under these 
models then, we should expect Hadza individuals to exhibit stable cooperative behavior. 
We also expect that behavior in the public goods at time t to relate to camp residency at 
time t + 1 with two possible patterns. If camp residency works like a market (Barclay, 
2013, 2016a; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994), with cooperative individuals being sought after 
and thus choosing each other, then we should observe individuals with similar 
cooperative levels at time t living with each other at time t + 1. However, if camp 
residency does not work like a market but cooperators are still preferred, then we should 
observe cooperators retaining more campmates between years.  
We examined whether individuals’ public goods contributions were related across 
years (Figure 1.4). Specifically, we tested whether current and past contributions were 
correlated for individuals in contiguous samples (n = 143 observations) by regressing 
public goods contributions at time t on contributions at time t – 1 controlling for year. In 
this and all subsequent regressions, we include robust standard errors clustered on 
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repeated observations. There was no relationship between individuals’ current and 
previous contributions, b = 0.00, SE = 0.09, t (139) = 0.05, p = 0.959; this remains 
nonsignificant when controlling for demographic variables and exposure to markets. We 
considered the possibility that individuals prefer to give relative to the camp mean; that 
is, some people prefer to contribute less than, more than, or as much as their campmates 
across years. We computed the difference between a person’s public goods contribution 
and the mean of the rest of their campmates and repeated the analysis again with these 
values. There was no relationship between contributions relative to campmates’ 
contribution at time t – 1 and contributions relative to campmates’ contributions at time t, 
b = 0.01, SE = 0.10, t (132) = 0.06, p = 0.950. 
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Figure 1.4. Contributions at time t by contributions at time t – 1. The unit of analysis is a 
participant year. Gray circles’ size is proportional to the count of individuals. Blue circles 
represent the average of the contribution in the following year as a function of the 
contribution in the current year. Bars represent 95% CI.  
 
Are individuals with higher public goods contributions more likely to continue 
living with their campmates in the future? To test this, for 2010, 2013, and 2014, we 
calculated for each individual who was in the sample at time t and time t + 1 the 
proportion of campmates at time t that lived in the same camp with the individual at time 
t + 1. We regressed public goods contributions at time t on the proportion of repeated 
campmates. There was a negative but nonsignificant, relationship. Individuals who 
contributed more at time t had fewer repeated campmates at time t + 1, b = -0.02, SE = 
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0.01, t (141) = -1.92, p = 0.057. Thus, there is no evidence that cooperators continue to 
live with more of their campmates. 
To further test if cooperative individuals were choosing to live with similarly 
cooperative individuals, we tested if the absolute difference in public goods contributions 
in a past year predicted whether Hadza will live together in a future year. We created a 
dataset for 2010, 2013, and 2014 of every possible dyad in each year, removing dyads if 
neither individual was present in the next sample. This resulted in 21,086 observations 
with 18,126 unique dyads across years. Of these observations, 789 (3.9%) of dyads were 
in the same camp. Using a binary logistic regression, we regressed whether the dyad lived 
in the same camp at time t + 1 on the similarity of public goods contributions at time t. 
Individuals who contributed similar amounts were not more likely to live in the same 
camp in future years, b = 0.01, SE = 0.04, OR = 1.01, Z = 0.24, p = 0.814, which 
remained nonsignificant after controlling for demographics variables (see Table 1.3).   
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Table 1.3. Binary Logistic Regression on Dyads Living in the Same Camp 
 b (SE) OR Z p 
Intercept -3.51 (0.17) 0.03 -20.37 < 0.001 
Lived together previously 0.37 (0.14) 1.44 2.56 0.010 
Similarity in PG contributions 0.01 (0.04) 1.01 0.24 0.814 
Both male 0.18 (0.11) 1.20 1.71 0.087 
Both female 0.28 (0.10) 1.33 2.74 0.006 
Both married -0.01 (0.09) 0.99 -0.10 0.922 
Both single -0.67 (0.33) 0.51 -2.03 0.042 
Similarity in age 0.01 (0.004) 1.01 1.65 0.099 
Similarity in number of living children 0.05 (0.02) 1.05 2.47 0.014 
Both lived in market region previously 0.13 (0.11) 1.13 1.10 0.273 
Both lived in non-market region 
previously 
0.48 (0.10) 1.62 4.75 < 0.001 
Note. Whether the dyad lived in the same camp at time t + 1 was regressed on variables 
in the model. All variables in the model are taken from time t. 
 
Campmates influence cooperative behavior 
To explore the role of social context we tested whether an ego’s contribution can 
be predicted by the mean contribution of their current campmates. First, we calculated for 
each person a camp mean contribution excluding ego’s own contribution. We regressed 
public goods contributions of ego on the mean contribution of other camp members 
controlling for year. We find that for each additional honey stick contributed by camp 
members, ego contributed, on average, another half-stick of honey, b = 0.55, SE = 0.15, t 
(138) = 3.60, p < 0.001. Note, we control for number of campmates since this affects the 
marginal per capita return. The result also remains significant when controlling for sex, 
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age, marital status, reproductive success and market exposure. Further, in 2010 and 2016, 
the only years for which we have kinship data, we regressed public goods contributions 
on campmates’ mean contributions controlling for number of close relationships (i.e., 
number of primary kin and spouse) in camp. Campmates’ mean contributions remained 
significant in this regression, b = 0.79, SE = 0.06, t (314) = 12.53, p < 0.001. 
For participants in which we have overlapping data across years, we also examine 
whether the mean contribution of an ego’s current campmates is a better predictor of 
ego’s current contribution than ego’s past contribution. For each year, we regressed ego’s 
current contribution at time t on the mean contribution of their campmates at time t and 
ego’s contribution at time t - 1. For each additional honey stick given by camp members, 
ego again contributed an additional half-stick of honey, b = 0.50, SE = 0.16, t (132) = 
3.11, p = 0.002. There was still no effect of previous contribution on current contribution, 
b = -0.01, SE = 0.08, t (132) = -0.15, p = 0.879. The results did not change when 
controlling for demographic variables (Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.4. OLS Regressions of Public Goods Contribution on Mean Camp 
Contribution and Previous Contribution  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mean camp contribution 0.36* 
 (0.16) 
 0.36*  
(0.16) 
Previous contribution  -0.01  
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
2014 0.53*  
(0.22) 
0.76**  
(0.25) 
0.53* 
(0.23) 
2016 0.76**  
(0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.23) 
0.76** 
(0.23) 
Male 0.17  
(0.19) 
0.18  
(0.19) 
0.17 
(0.19) 
Age 0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Married 0.25  
(0.31) 
0.33  
(0.29) 
0.25 
(0.31) 
Number of living children -0.03  
(0.03) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Exposure to market -0.03 
(0.19) 
-0.04 
(0.25) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
Number of campmates at time t -0.03*  
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*  
(0.01) 
Note. Values are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. All analyses are restricted to contributions in 2013, 2014, and 2016, and to 
individuals with a previous contribution in the sample year prior. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Discussion 
While multiple theoretical models have been proposed to explain the evolution of 
cooperation, there is little evidence on what theories actually explain cooperation in 
evolutionarily-relevant settings. The Hadza provide an important test case for 
evolutionary models of cooperation: Their daily life is marked by widespread sharing of 
food, labor, and childcare. And their lifeways more closely approximate pre-Neolithic 
populations compared to samples drawn from industrialized settings (Henrich et al., 
2010).  
While nearly all models involve some behavioral flexibility such that an 
individual’s level of cooperation is contingent on the social environment, most partner 
choice models assume that individuals have fixed, often heritable, dispositions on which 
the choice of partners is based (Aktipis, 2011; Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; J. M. 
McNamara et al., 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). In these models, individuals can 
leave current partners or reject prospective partners based on their own personal 
interactions with that partner or their observations of them. We find no evidence that 
cooperative behavior persists over time – a condition that makes it difficult for observers 
to make informed decisions on who to choose as partners.  
Natural selection should favor individuals who select partners based on the 
benefits their cooperative behavior generates, which is determined by both their partner’s 
willingness and ability to cooperate (Barclay, 2016a). Whether willingness or ability to 
cooperate is valued more as a criterion for partners will depend, in part, on which trait is 
more variable in the population (Barclay & Raihani, 2016). In laboratory studies, 
participants display a preference for partners who are willing to cooperate, possibly 
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because cooperative contributions are artificially constrained. Conversely, the Hadza 
have strong norms governing cooperation and sharing. If everyone shares because they 
are expected to, then one’s ability to share may be valued more than their willingness to 
share. In fact, when given the choice, the Hadza do not choose the most cooperative 
individuals as campmates (Apicella et al., 2012). Instead, physical traits show small, but 
positive correlations with how often individuals are chosen as campmates, possibly 
because these traits indicate one’s ability to acquire resources (Apicella, 2014). Testing 
whether the Hadza trade-off willingness to cooperate for other qualities would be an 
interesting avenue for future study.  
In a small sample of Tsimane' forager-horticulturalists (n = 12), generosity was 
not shown to correlate over time (Gurven, 2014). Our findings, however, contrast with 
laboratory studies using Western samples illustrating small-to-medium-sized correlations 
in cooperative game play over time (Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Volk et al., 2012). The 
discrepant results may also be due to the longer intervals between testing in our study. 
Also, the Hadza are playing the game with different, but well-known, individuals each 
year. In laboratory settings, individuals often play in the same anonymous or unfamiliar 
group setting each time. However, when these individuals are assigned to cooperative or 
non-cooperative environments, they adopt the dominant strategy and use the cooperator 
or defector strategy at later times (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015; Stagnaro, Arechar, & 
Rand, 2017). Finally, cultural differences in dispositional consistency may also explain 
the divergent results. Compared to individuals from collectivist societies, Westerners tend 
to describe themselves in terms of underlying traits and have a stronger preference for 
self-consistency (Heine, 2001).  
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While we cannot isolate the exact mechanism(s) generating the within-group 
homogeneity on cooperation, we find that cooperative behavior in any given year is best 
predicted by the cooperativeness of one’s current residence group. The results are 
consistent with social learning of local norms and reciprocity theories of cooperation that 
assume people have reciprocal, conditional strategies. And the findings concur with 
laboratory experiments demonstrating that cooperative and selfish play in economic 
games influences others to behave similarly, leading to the spread of different 
cooperative behaviors in the population (Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Jordan, Rand, 
Arbesman, Fowler, & Christakis, 2013).  
By using an economic game as our measure of cooperation, as opposed to 
measuring naturally occurring levels of cooperation, we traded-off some ecological 
validity for increased experimental control. We chose the public goods game due to its 
direct relevance to hunter-gatherer life where collective action problems are a daily 
occurrence. We observe that across years, the Hadza, on average, contribute 56% of their 
endowment to the public goods, providing some reassurance that local institutions are 
mapping onto game play.  
It is difficult to establish the same degree of control in field settings that are found 
in the laboratory. Thus, the problem of omitted variable bias is a concern as there may be 
other influences on cooperation that were unobserved. For example, research in WEIRD 
populations have found that incidental emotions resulting from weather (Hirshleifer & 
Shumway, 2003), sex (Gabbi & Zanotti, 2019), and sporting outcomes (Otto, Fleming, & 
Glimcher, 2016) influence economic decisions-making. It is possible that camps were 
similarly experiencing different fortunes on the days in which cooperation was measured 
32 
 
and this is the reason for clustering. This alternative is supported by the 2013 data in 
which risk preferences were similarly clustered; however, the fact that cooperation 
remained clustered after controlling for risk suggests this cannot entirely explain the 
observed clustering. Future work would benefit from more in-depth examinations into 
other factors that influence Hadza decisions to cooperate.  
A third limitation of the study is that we collected data at discrete points far apart 
in time and are limited by how much we can say about the formation and breakdown of 
camps in relation to cooperation. Hunter-gatherer residence is determined by multiple and 
complex demographic, ecological and personal factors (Apicella et al., 2012; Hill et al., 
2014). Examining the role of cooperation in Hadza camp formation and dissolution, as 
well as examining how initial variation in levels of cooperation between individuals 
converges on a stable equilibrium within a camp, are important areas for future 
exploration.  
Studying the conduits of norm establishment and reinforcement in hunter-
gatherers hold particular promise. Storytelling, for instance, may be an effective way to 
teach and establish norms (D. Smith et al., 2017), including norms of reciprocity. 
Recently, it has been documented that among Agta foragers, groups with more skilled 
storytellers are more cooperative (D. Smith et al., 2017). Moreover, there is a large 
literature demonstrating how ritual activities, which are thought to enable the expression 
of shared beliefs and norms, can impact cooperation and fairness (Sosis & Ruffle, 2003). 
Hadza life is replete with public and private ritualistic activities – including song, dance, 
meat-eating, storytelling and puberty initiation practices – which are thought to play an 
important role in cementing relationships and promoting cooperation (Hill et al., 2014).  
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Our findings challenge all evolutionary models of cooperation that assume fixed 
social types. Consistent with models stressing the importance of contingent reciprocity, 
cultural learning and social norms (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; 
Gurven, 2006) we find that individuals’ cooperative behavior is best predicted by the 
cooperativeness of their neighbors. The findings highlight the flexible nature of human 
cooperation and the remarkable capacity of humans to respond adaptively to their social 
environments. 
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CHAPTER 2: HADZA HUNTER-GATHERERS DISAGREE ON PERCEPTIONS 
OF MORAL CHARACTER 
To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there 
should exist agreement between people in their judgements of others’ character. In 
Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in 
Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on 
global character and relevant character traits for a total of 824 observations. Judges 
disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty, but agreed more on 
hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character 
evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and 
hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs 
about what traits constitute character, but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit 
these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable 
moral dispositions may not be universal. 
Introduction 
In Western societies, evaluation of moral character is an important component of 
person perception (Goodwin, 2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). When learning 
about a new person, Italian undergraduates seek information about whether they are 
trustworthy (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). When identifying features 
and traits most relevant to identity, online workers in the US consider morality to be an 
essential component (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). And when US undergraduates 
consider what attributes a partner should have in different types of relationships, morally 
relevant features, such as trustworthiness, are most important (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 
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2007). This makes sense because a person’s character is used to infer their intentions 
toward us and whether they would help or hinder our goals (Landy et al., 2016). Indeed, 
people use information about moral character to decide who to interact and cooperate 
with (Everett et al., 2018; Martin & Cushman, 2015; van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & 
Rutjens, 2017).  
Despite the importance of moral character in person perception, some have argued 
that character does not exist and that people do not have stable moral dispositions  (Doris, 
2002; Harman, 2003). Social psychologists and philosophers have used classic findings 
from social psychology, such as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & 
Darley, 1968) or the good Samaritan experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), to argue 
against the existence of moral character and that moral behavior is determined wholly by 
the situation (Doris, 2002; Harman, 2003). One way to determine whether people behave 
similarly across situations is to examine agreement between independent observers. 
Because different observers are likely to interact with the target in different situations, if 
they agree in their evaluations, it then suggests there is a stable disposition that is being 
observed (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). So, if independent observers have similar 
perceptions of targets’ moral character, then it provides some evidence for the existence 
of moral character. 
People generally agree on who does, and does not, have moral character. In a US 
community sample, self-report and informant ratings of morally-relevant traits, such as 
honesty or guilt-proneness, moderately correlate (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 
2013). Independent observers in US community samples also agree on global evaluations 
of moral character, as well as specific moral traits and trait profiles. (Helzer et al., 2014). 
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And online workers in the US agree on morally relevant traits displayed by respected 
cultural figures, even across the US political divide (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & 
MacKinlay, 2013). Again, this agreement is used as evidence that moral character exists.  
Like much of behavioral and social science research, samples in studies of moral 
psychology have largely been drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic—or WEIRD—societies (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 
2019; Henrich et al., 2010). Despite this, the importance of moral character in identity 
and person perception is theorized to be universal (Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 
2017). Most often, when moral psychology is examined in other cultures, the emphasis is 
on the content of moral norms and the shared or unique prescriptions and prohibitions 
across cultures (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; 
Purzycki et al., 2018). Yet, when research has looked at processes in moral judgments, 
important differences have been found. For example, whether a wrong is done 
intentionally is an important distinction in moral judgments among Western populations, 
presumably because it reveals information about moral character (Landy & Uhlmann, 
2018). However, unintentional violations are judged as wrong as intentional violations in 
some cultures, including the Hadza and South Pacific islanders (Barrett et al., 2016; R. A. 
McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019). To our knowledge, no research has 
been conducted on perceptions of moral character in small-scale societies. 
There are reasons to suspect important differences in moral character and its 
perception in small-scale societies. First, there is some evidence for less personality 
variation in non-WEIRD societies. For example, personality traits in the Tsimané 
forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia do not cluster into five distinct factors, but rather two, 
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and there is less variation within those factors compared to Western samples (Gurven, 
von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Vie, 2013). And in fact, across 55 nations, 
populations with fewer economic opportunities to specialize have less variation in 
personality traits (Lukaszewski, Gurven, von Rueden, & Schmitt, 2017). To the extent 
that there is a relationship between personality traits and moral character (Thalmayer, 
Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, & Costello, 2019), we might then similarly expect less 
variation in morally-relevant character traits. Second, there is no evidence for generous 
dispositions in small-scale societies. In longitudinal data among the Hadza, contributions 
to a public good game were not predicted by previous contributions, but rather the 
contributions of an individual’s campmates (K. M. Smith, Larroucau, Mabulla, & 
Apicella, 2018). Here, strong, local norms governing generosity may be reducing 
individual variation in morally-relevant behavior leading to a lack of agreement on 
perceptions of moral character.  
In the current study, we examine perceptions of moral character among the Hadza 
of Tanzania, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups in the world. The Hadza are 
an ideal population because they live in small groups of known individuals where 
behavior is observable, and because of their harsh environment, knowing who is moral 
would be seemingly important. We examine agreement on these perceptions in two ways. 
First, do Hadza agree on who has moral character? And second, do Hadza agree on what 
traits contribute to global moral character? To answer these questions, we ask the Hadza 
to rank their campmates on moral character, as well as specific traits of hard work, 
generosity, and honesty. We examine the consensus within each camp on rank orderings 
for each trait to answer the first question. We examine the relationship between the 
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specific traits and global character rankings and the variation between Hadza on the 
importance of the specific traits in determining global character to answer the second 
question.  
Method 
Population 
The Hadza are a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers living in rural north Tanzania 
around Lake Eyasi. There are about 300 Hadza who still practice a foraging lifestyle 
(Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza have a sexual division of labor; men hunt for game, such as 
giraffe, impala, or zebra, and collect honey, while women gather plant items, such as 
tubers and berries. Food brought back to the camp that requires extended processing, 
such as meat and tubers, are distributed across the entire camp. Food and fresh water is 
scarce; about 80% of Hadza report concerns about whether there will be enough food in 
the next month (Apicella, 2018). Other threats to Hadza include high rates of disease and 
infection, and less commonly, attacks from predators, such as lions, hyenas, leopards, and 
snakes. Approximately 40% of children born will not live to reach the age of five 
(Blurton-Jones, 2016). 
 The Hadza live in temporary camps of about 30 adults and children, usually 
consisting of two to three unrelated nuclear families. The Hadza a have multilocal 
residence pattern—men and women are equally likely to live with kin, though the 
average genetic relatedness for both sexes within camps is low (Blurton-Jones, 2016; Hill 
et al., 2011). Camps move location every 4 to 6 weeks as local resources are depleted, 
and people frequently join new camps as they please. Repeat interaction rates are low in 
39 
 
the Hadza (Hill et al., 2014), and from year-to-year, individuals are only living with about 
20% of their previous campmates (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). 
 Though the Hadza have strong norms of food sharing, they do try to cheat these 
norms when possible. In economic games that measure rule-bending, Hadza will cheat to 
benefit themselves at the expense of their campmates (Apicella, 2018). Anecdotally, 
Hadza will sometimes try to bring in meat under the cover of darkness to avoid sharing 
with others and will sometimes even ask to hide carcasses under a researcher’s vehicle 
(Marlowe, 2010). Hadza historically have little experience with centralized institutions 
involving punishment (e.g., police and courts). In economic games, the Hadza have low-
rates of second- and third-party punishment (Henrich, 2006). And though most Hadza 
report believing in god (Haine or sometimes Ishoko), few attribute to Haine moralistic 
concerns or the power to detect and punish norm violations (Apicella, 2018). Thus, there 
are opportunities for the Hadza to show variation in moral behavior and for others to 
witness it, though observed deviations may not be punished.  
Sample 
The first author and research assistants visited 12 camps1 during the dry-season in 
August-September 2016 using a snowball sampling procedure; after visiting one camp, 
members of that camp would direct us toward the nearest camp. We collected data until 
we could not identify any more camps. The number of adults in each camp ranged from 
three to twelve. We interviewed 94 judges who ranked 95 subjects (one participant left 
                                                          
1 We collected data from a thirteenth camp that had 36 adults; judges found the task of ranking this many 
people arduous. We had judges in this camp rank the top twelve campmates on each trait instead. However, 
the analyses used here require people to be ranking the same set of participants, so we did not use these 
data. Data for this camp were never entered or analyzed. 
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camp after his photo was taken but before he was interviewed) for a total of N = 824 
observations. Two judges (n = 20 observations) were removed because they refused to 
rank their campmates on honesty, stating that everyone in their camp is a liar. Another 
two observations were removed because of an error in recording the data. The final 
sample included 95 subjects (n = 46 men, mean age M = 39.8 years-old, n = 68 married) 
ranked by 92 judges for n = 802 observations.  
Procedure 
We asked judges to rank their campmates on generosity (“Who shares the most 
food?”), hard work or effort (“Who works the hardest to get food?”), honesty (“Who tells 
the fewest lies?”), and global moral character (“Who has the best heart?”). We asked 
about generosity, hard work, and honesty because in previous research when Hadza are 
asked to free list traits that make a good person these were some of the nominated traits 
(Purzycki et al., 2018). We used “good heart” as a global character judgment because this 
was the most common response in the free list task and the Hadza seem to equate good 
heart with being a good person. We also asked them to rank men on who is the best 
hunter (“Who is the best hunter?”), and which we include as a non-moral comparison. 
Finally, we asked them who they prefer as campmates, but do not include that data here. 
 To have judges rank their campmates, we took headshot photographs of all the 
consenting adults in a camp using a Fujifilm Instax Mini 90 Classic Instant Film Camera 
which printed 1.8 × 2.4 inch images. We then conducted private interviews in Swahili 
with each adult. A research assistant would shuffle the photographs and lay them in front 
of the judge. The assistant would then ask the judge, “Who shares the most food?” After 
the judge picked a photograph, the assistant would remove the photograph, shuffle the 
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remaining photographs, and repeat the question. This was repeated until all campmates 
were ranked on that trait. The entire process was then repeated for each trait. The Hadza 
have previously done this task multiple times to rank campmates on hunting ability 
(Apicella, 2014; K. M. Smith, Olkhov, Puts, & Apicella, 2017; Stibbard-Hawkes, 
Attenborough, & Marlowe, 2018).  
Analysis 
We used Bayesian regression models for inferential analyses. Bayesian analyses 
compute the probability the observed data are generated by a hypothesized parameter 
value, conditional on the model assumptions and prior probabilities (Kruschke & Liddell, 
2018a; McElreath, 2016). This produces a distribution of probability values across a 
range of possible parameter values. This allows us to describe the estimated strength of 
the relationship and the uncertainty around the estimate, rather than focusing on point 
hypothesis testing (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). In our analyses we use weakly 
regularizing priors; these are conservative priors that are skeptical of large associations 
and that restrict the estimates to more plausible values (McElreath, 2016).  
We analyzed the data in R (R, 2017) using the ‘rjags’ (Plummer, 2018) and 
‘brms’ (Bürkner, 2017) packages. Both packages use Monte Carlo Markov Chains to 
draw samples from the posterior distributions, drawing more samples from regions with 
higher probabilities to estimate the posterior distribution; the packages use different 
algorithms to explore the distribution. We also used the ‘tidyverse’ (Wickham, 2017b), 
‘tidybayes’ (Kay, 2018), ‘ggridges’ (Wilke, 2018), and ‘irr’ (Gamer, Lemon, & Fellows, 
2012) packages. 
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Results 
Do Hadza agree on who is moral? 
We examined the extent to which Hadza agree on the ranking of each trait by 
computing a Kendall’s W for each trait for each camp. Kendall’s W is a coefficient of 
consensus for ranking data, and it has a range of zero to one, with zero indicating no 
agreement between raters and one indicating complete agreement (Zar, 1996). A 
suggested benchmark for Kendall’s W is that 0.5 indicates moderate agreement and 0.3 
indicates weak agreement. The observed values are presented in Figure 2.1. The median 
value for good heart was 0.19 and ranged from 0.04 to 0.31, the median value for effort 
was 0.25 and ranged from 0.07 to 0.60, the median value for generosity was 0.19 and 
ranged from 0.00 to 0.48, the median value for honesty was 0.19 and ranged from 0.10 to 
0.44, and the median value for hunting ability was 0.40 and ranged from 0.16 to 0.63. 
The median values for effort, generosity, honesty, and good heart all fall below the 
suggested benchmark for weak agreement. 
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Figure 2.1. Kendall’s W for each trait for each camp with boxplots. The points represent 
observed values, the size of the points represent the number of subjects ranked, and the 
color indicates camp. The light dashed line is at 0.5, which is suggested as moderate 
agreement, and the heavy dashed line is at 0.3, which is suggested as weak agreement. 
Two camps had only one man and were not included in the calculation for ranking on 
hunting ability. 
 
For inferential analyses, we used a transformed value of Kendall’s W. A 
transformed Kendall’s W has a chi-square distribution such that 𝑚(𝑘 − 1)𝑊~𝛸2(𝑘 −
1, 𝜆), where m is the number of judges, k is the number of items being ranked, and λ is 
the non-centrality parameter (Zar, 1996). This allows us to estimate a population-wide 
level of agreement within each camp; the estimated values were then be used to simulate 
statistics describing the level of agreement. We fit a linear regression model with a non-
44 
 
central chi-square distribution likelihood estimating λ given the transformed W’s for each 
trait and camp and the number of subjects ranked. We included random intercepts for 
camps, and dummy-coded the traits relative to the good heart rankings. To fit the model, 
we used ‘rjags’ (Plummer, 2018) with four chains; the chains had 10,000 iterations burn-
in and each chain sampled 5,000 iterations from the posterior distribution for a total of 
20,000 samples. 
Table 2.1.  Estimated Non-centrality Parameter and Simulated Kendall’s W for each 
Trait 
Trait λ W (m = 6) W (m = 8) W (m = 10) 
Heart 2.19 [0.94, 3.74] 0.24 [0.20, 0.29] 0.16 [0.14, 0.19] 0.12 [0.11, 0.14] 
Honesty 1.70 [0.63, 4.12] 0.24 [0.19, 0.31] 0.16 [0.14, 0.20] 0.12 [0.11, 0.15] 
Generosity 1.31 [0.41, 3.04] 0.21 [0.18, 0.27] 0.15 [0.13, 0.18] 0.12 [0.10, 0.13] 
Effort 3.85 [1.62, 7.35] 0.30 [0.22, 0.41] 0.19 [0.15, 0.25] 0.14 [0.12, 0.18] 
Hunt 5.07 [2.13, 8.83] 0.58 [0.36, 0.90] 0.33 [0.21, 0.48]  0.22 [0.15, 0.31] 
Note. Values are modal values from the posterior with 90% HDI intervals in brackets. λ is 
the estimated non-centrality parameter. W values are simulated from the non-centrality 
parameter for a camp with m judges. For all traits but hunting, there are k = m subjects; 
for hunting, k = m/2. 
 
Table 2.1 presents the estimated non-centrality parameter for each trait. From 
these non-centrality parameters, we simulated Kendall’s W’s for each trait; because W is 
dependent on the number of judges and people being ranked, we simulated W for a small 
(m = 6), medium (m = 8), and large (m = 10) camp. For all the good heart, generosity, and 
honesty, even in the small camp, the simulated values fell below the 0.30 value for weak 
agreement, whereas for effort the values in small camps were near this benchmark and 
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for hunting ability the values in the small camp were above the benchmark for moderate 
agreement (0.50). In larger camps, the estimated W for every trait falls below 0.30, except 
for hunting ability, which in medium camps still falls above that benchmark. We also 
directly compared the estimated non-centrality parameters between each trait (see Table 
2.2) to compare agreement holding camp size constant; Hadza agreed more on rankings 
of hunting ability and effort than they did on rankings of good heart, generosity, and 
honesty.  
Table 2.2. Comparisons of Estimated Non-centrality Parameters Between each Trait 
 Heart Honesty Generosity Effort Hunt 
Heart  0.52 0.80 0.05 0.01 
Honesty 0.49  0.73 0.09 0.02 
Generosity 0.20 0.27  0.02 0.00 
Effort 0.95 0.92 0.98  0.25 
Hunt 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.75  
Note. Values are proportions of posterior in which λ for the trait in the row is greater than 
the λ for the trait in the column.  
 
We converted the simulated W values to r such that 𝑟 =
𝑚𝑊−1
𝑚−1
; r is the mean 
Spearman’s ρ between each possible pair of judges (Zar, 1996), or the expected 
agreement between pairs of judges. In a medium sized (m = 8) camp, the modal simulated 
r value for good heart r = 0.04 [90% HDI: 0.02, 0.08], for honesty r = 0.04 [90% HDI: 
0.02, 0.09], for generosity r = 0.03 [90% HDI: 0.01, 0.06], for effort r = 0.08 [90% HDI: 
0.03, 0.15], and for hunting r = 0.23 [90% HDI: 0.10, 0.41]. Figure 2.2 presents the 
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distribution of simulated r values for each trait for each small, medium, and large camps. 
These values indicate that judges disagree on their rankings of campmates’ character.   
 
Figure 2.2. Simulated r values from the estimated non-centrality parameter for each trait. 
For heart, honesty, generosity, and effort, the number of judges and the number of 
subjects being ranked are equal to camp size; for hunting, the number of subjects being 
ranked is half the camp size. 
 
Do Hadza agree on what makes someone moral? 
To examine which traits Hadza consider important to moral character, we fit an 
ordered logistic model regressing rankings of good heart on rankings of effort, 
generosity, and honesty, as well as the subject’s sex, age (z-scored), marital status, and 
the relationship between judge and subject (i.e., self, spouse, kin, or none). Character 
rankings were centered within each camp such that rank changes are relative to the camp 
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median. We include random intercepts for camp and subject, random slopes for camp and 
judge for every effect, and random slopes for subject for the effects of character rankings 
and the relationship between judge and subject. We fit the model using ‘brms’ (Bürkner, 
2017), which implements Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) to estimate the posterior. We used 
one chain with 20,000 iterations, the first 10,000 iterations were warm-up, with a step 
parameter of δ = 0.95. 
Population-level effects 
We first examined the population-level effects. Table 2.3 presents the coefficients 
for all variables in the model. There was strong evidence that higher rankings on effort 
and generosity were related to higher rankings on good heart, while there was suggestive 
evidence that higher rankings on honesty were related to higher rankings on good heart. 
There was some evidence that older Hadza had higher rankings on good heart, otherwise 
demographic variables did not relate to rankings on good heart. We simulated rankings of 
good heart as a function of rankings on effort, generosity, and honesty in the largest camp 
(n = 12) and computed the expected difference in good heart ranking between the highest 
and lowest ranked person on each trait. The modal difference for effort was 3.2 (90% 
HDI: 1.9, 4.4) ranks, for generosity 1.7 (90% HDI: 0.2, 3.0) ranks, and for honesty 0.9 
(90% HDI: -0.3, 2.6) ranks. Figure 2.3 presents the full range of simulated rankings.   
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Table 2.3. Model Regressing Good Heart Ranking on Character Rankings and 
Subject Demographics 
Coefficient b 90% HDI % > 0 
Effort 0.24 0.13 – 0.35 100 
Generosity 0.13 0.02 – 0.24 97.2 
Honesty 0.08 -0.04 – 0.20 88.1 
Female 0.21 -1.37 – 1.62 54.3 
Married 0.29 -0.31 – 0.73 76.5 
Age 0.22 -0.13 – 0.54 85.4 
Spouse 0.32 -0.38 – 1.22 79.1 
Kin 0.34 -0.39 – 1.02 78.4 
Self 0.00 -0.87 – 1.06 56.1 
Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest 
posterior density interval (HDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the posterior, 
or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent of the 
posterior greater than zero.  
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Figure 2.3. Ranking on good heart by ranking on each character trait, centered within 
camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered logistic 
distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were predicted 
ranking. The line is the modal simulated value and the shaded region is the 90% credible 
interval.   
 
Judge-level effects 
To determine whether judges agreed on how much the specific traits contributed 
to an individual’s global character, we examined variation between judges on the 
relationship between character rankings and good heart rankings. First, we fit a series of 
eight models including varying slopes for judges for none, one, two, or all of the 
character traits; the eight models were otherwise identical. This allowed us to examine 
whether including extra parameters to estimate varying slopes for judges was worth the 
improved fit. Table 2.4 presents fit statistics for these models, including the Akaike 
weight. The Akaike weight is the probability that a model would best predict a new 
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sample of data compared to all the other models under consideration (McElreath, 2016). 
The Akaike weight is distributed across most of the models. Models including random 
slopes for effort had 0.35 of the weight, models including random slopes for generosity 
had 0.54 of the weight, and random slopes for models including honesty had 0.95 of the 
weight; this indicates that the model most likely to best estimate the data is likely to 
include disagreement between judges on the contribution of honesty to good heart, and is 
less likely to include disagreement on the contribution of effort and generosity to good 
heart.there is good evidence for disagreement between judges on the contribution of 
honesty to good heart, and less evidence for disagreement on generosity and effort.  
Rather than selecting one model as the best fitting, we constructed a weighted-average 
posterior using the Akaike weights (McElreath, 2016) and examined the variation 
between judges using that posterior. 
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Table 2.4. Fit of Models Regressing Good Hearts Rankings on Character Rankings  
Model WAIC SEWAIC pWAIC Akaike weight 
Baseline 1760.77 29.80 100.90 0.02 
Effort 1761.11 29.61 107.82 0.01 
Generosity 1761.14 29.58 113.17 0.01 
Honesty 1754.80 31.13 123.21 0.30 
Effort + Generosity 1761.29 29.50 118.45 0.01 
Effort + Honesty 1756.49 30.99 128.09 0.13 
Generosity + Honesty 1754.68 30.99 139.14 0.32 
Full 1755.60 31.03 142.67 0.20 
Note. Model names refer to what character traits in the model had random slopes for 
judges. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number 
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC 
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed 
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data 
among the considered models.  
 
In the weighted-average posterior, the modal σJudge of varying slopes for effort 
was 0.00 (90% HDI: 0, 0.13), for generosity 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.26), and for honesty 
0.24 (90% HDI: 0.09, 0.38). We also compared the σJudge to the population coefficient; 
the percent of the posterior for which the σJudge was greater than the population coefficient 
for effort was 2.0%, for generosity 40.2%, and for honesty 88.8%; there was good 
evidence that knowing a particular judge’s belief of the role of honesty in character 
provided more information than knowing the population’s belief, but this was not the 
case for effort and generosity. Finally, as another way to examine consensus, we 
computed the expected proportion of judges to have a negative slope between rankings 
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on each trait and rankings on good heart. The modal expected proportion of negative 
slopes for effort was 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.04), for generosity 0.00 (90% HDI: 0.00, 
0.38), and for honesty 0.38 (90% HDI: 0.00, 0.51). Again, for honesty, even though at the 
population level more honest Hadza were ranked higher on good heart, a number of 
judges ranked more honest Hadza lower on good heart. Figure 2.4 presents at the mean of 
the posterior the simulated variation between judges across rankings.  
 
Figure 2.4. Ranking on good heart by ranking on each character trait, centered within 
camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered logistic 
distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were predicted 
ranking. Each line is a simulated judge’s slope taken from the mean of weighted-average 
posterior. 
 
Discussion 
In WEIRD societies, people evaluate the moral character of others and use those 
perceptions to decide with whom to interact. Underscoring the importance of character in 
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these populations, independent observers agree on how moral others are (Helzer et al., 
2014). But is this universal? To answer this, we asked if Hadza hunter-gatherers agree on 
who is moral and what traits make someone moral. The Hadza disagree on which of their 
campmates have a good heart, are generous, and are honest, and agree more on which 
campmates are hard working (effort) and produce the most food (hunting ability). At the 
level of the population, hard work, generosity, and honesty contribute to global character; 
however, there is variation between Hadza judges on how much honesty contributes to 
global character, though judges agree more on how much hard work and generosity 
contribute to character. Overall, these results suggest that Hadza use some of the same 
criteria—hard work and generosity—for evaluating moral character, but disagree on who 
displays those traits, leading to disagreement on global character perceptions.  
 Agreement between independent observers on ratings about a trait is taken as 
evidence for that trait existing because raters are likely observing the same behaviors 
despite being in different situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). The disagreement 
between Hadza judges on character traits suggests that Hadza may have little stable 
variation in moral dispositions.2 However, disagreement does not definitively rule out the 
existence of moral character. For example, the Hadza may have been unwilling to make 
assessments about their campmates’ character, though notably we do see agreement on 
hunting ability, which is highly valued in the Hadza. Or there could be disagreement 
because there are not many opportunities to display moral behavior; however, it should 
be easy to observe moral behavior because they live together in small groups and depend 
                                                          
2 To be clear, the claim is not that the Hadza are not moral or that morality is not important to them. Rather, 
the claim is that individuals’ moral behavior varies across time, changing to adapt to local circumstances. 
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on each other for survival. Finally, another alternative is that Hadza display consistent 
moral behavior to specific people; that is, a person could always be generous to one 
campmate and selfish to another campmate, leading to disagreement between campmates 
in evaluations of moral character. Future research exploring the stability of judge-subject 
rankings across time could address this alternative interpretation. 
 One alternative interpretation of the data is that the Hadza can agree on moral 
character, and in fact they do have moral dispositions, but that our measure is unreliable 
and cannot detect agreement. A good measure measuring a phenomenon that does not 
exist and a bad measure measuring a phenomenon that does exist will produce the same 
result: noise. However, we argue there are two reasons to suspect that our measure would 
be reliable enough to detect agreement on moral character if it existed. First, we were 
able to detect moderate relationships between the specific character traits and moral 
character, indicating reliability was not so low as to be unable to detect any effects. 
Second, we did find moderate agreement on hard work and hunting ability. And in fact, 
given what we know about the noisy relationship between hunting returns and hunting 
reputation (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the fact that we were able to detect agreement 
suggests low reliability can not fully explain the disagreement in perceptions of moral 
character.  
 It may seem that hunting ability would be easily observable, but in the 
anthropological literature, this is notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this 
hunting reputation is criticized as a measure of hunting success (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). 
First, hunting ability is rarely directly observed, as most hunting happens alone. And 
second, there is high variance in hunting returns, in which men return to camp with 
55 
 
nothing on most days, but occasionally (about 3% of days) bring in large game (Hawkes, 
O’Connell, & Blurton-Jones, 1991). In fact, for anthropologists to reliably estimate 
hunting ability using hunting returns, they need 200 to 600 days of observations (Hill & 
Kintigh, 2009). Despite this, in our study and others (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the 
Hadza are able to agree on who the best hunters are, and hunting reputation does relate to 
proxies of actual hunting ability, such as strength, accuracy, and ecological knowledge 
(Apicella, 2014; Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). This suggests that if there are moral 
dispositions among the Hadza, the signal is much weaker than that of hunting ability, 
which is itself a noisy signal (Stibbard-Hawkes, 2019). If it is this hard to detect moral 
dispositions, it then raises the question of whether the Hadza can reliably determine 
character enough to provide useful social information. 
 Data measuring morally-relevant behavior, such as generosity, further suggest a 
stable variation in lack of moral dispositions in the Hadza and other non-WEIRD 
populations. In a longitudinal study, a Hadza’s previous generosity in an economic game 
did not predict their subsequent contributions, and instead the only significant predictor 
was how much his or her campmates contribute (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). And in a 
small study (n = 12) of the Tsimané of Bolivia, generosity in a dictator game in one year 
did not predict generosity in a later year (Gurven, 2014).   
 These results further support recent research finding that character and moral 
reputation do not play a role in Hadza campmate preferences. When asked who they 
prefer to live with, Hadza do not choose the most generous people, whether generosity is 
measured using an economic game (Apicella et al., 2012) or via reputation (K. M. Smith 
& Apicella, 2019). Rather, Hadza prefer to live with better hunters (K. M. Smith & 
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Apicella, 2019; Wood, 2006). If moral behavior changes across time and situations as our 
results here suggest, then choosing campmates based on their current behavior is useless. 
Instead, traits related to productivity, such as being a hard worker or a good hunter, may 
become more important in campmate preferences (Barclay, 2016b); if everyone is 
expected to share because of strong norms, such as in the Hadza, then choosing 
productive campmates is more important. And in fact, a preference for productive 
partners may influence friendships in Western societies. US undergraduates and online 
workers prefer partners in economic games and are more generous to partners who are 
perceived to be more productive, even though it is irrelevant to the game (Eisenbruch, 
Grillot, Maestripieri, & Roney, 2016; Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). The effect of a 
productivity preference in various relationships may be a fruitful area for future research.  
 Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the situationist paradigm in social 
psychology casted doubt on the existence of moral character. However, more recent 
research in moral psychology has argued that moral character does in fact exist (Fleeson, 
Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014). In Western societies, people agree on who 
is moral (Helzer et al., 2014), and perceptions of moral character play an important role 
in social cognition (Goodwin, 2015; Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). Our results here question 
the universality of moral character and its centrality in social life, and highlights the 
importance of cross-cultural research using underrepresented samples. By conducting 
research with populations in a variety of socio-ecologies, we can better understand the 
variation in our moral psychology. 
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CHAPTER 3: PARNTER CHOICE IN HUMAN EVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF 
CHARACTER, HUNTING ABILITY, AND RECIPROCITY IN HADZA 
CAMPMATE SELECTION 
The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important 
driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, for our propensity to 
cooperate. But evidence for this claim comes largely from Western populations. Here, we 
investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e. campmate) in Hadza 
hunter-gatherers of northern Tanzania. Ninety-two Hadza participants from 12 camps 
ranked their current campmates on character traits (i.e. hard work, generosity, and 
honesty), hunting ability in men, and their preference for them as future campmates. We 
found positive but weak associations between rankings on character traits and being a 
preferred campmate. However, there was suggestive evidence that being perceived as a 
better hunter was a more important criterion than any character traits for being a preferred 
campmate in men. And we found little evidence to suggest that partner preferences were 
reciprocated among campmates. Finally, we found little evidence to suggest that being a 
preferred campmate is associated with greater reproductive success, which suggests there 
is little benefit to being a valued partner. Together, these findings suggest that social 
selection for character traits was not a powerful driving force in the evolution of human 
cooperation. 
Introduction 
Living in groups can offer many benefits to animals. Group living offers 
protection from predators, access to mates, opportunities for collaborative foraging, and 
the potential exchange of resources, among other benefits. However, social living 
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introduces competition to gain access to partners that provide the most benefits. If the 
most valuable partners can choose who to share their benefits with, and they in turn want 
the most valuable partners they can access, then partners that offer the most benefits are a 
valuable resource to compete over. This is commonly observed in the context of mate 
choice, where the most prized males and females will pair (Buston & Emlen, 2003), often 
resulting in the sexual selection of traits that provide an advantage over same-sex 
competitors. However, sexual selection is a form of social selection (Lyon & 
Montgomerie, 2012; West-Eberhard, 1983), and social animals can compete for access to 
valuable partners in a number of domains, leading to the evolution of costly 
morphological and behavioral traits.  
Social selection may have been especially important in human evolution, and in 
particular, the evolution of cooperation (Barclay, 2016a; Baumard et al., 2013; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1996). While mutual cooperation can benefit both partners, cooperation risks 
costly exploitation. However, if people have the option to leave exploitative social 
partners for more cooperative ones, then cooperation can be a stable strategy (Aktipis, 
2011; Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011). Because valuable cooperative partners have 
the option to leave and pick other valued partners, people must compete for access to the 
most cooperative people. And the best way to compete for a valuable partner is to also be 
a valuable partner. 
Valuable social partners are those that can provide the most benefits to their 
partners. The benefit potential partners provide is the function of two values: their 
willingness and their ability to confer benefits (Barclay, 2013, 2016a). A skilled but 
stingy partner is able to generate benefits but does not share them, and a generous but 
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incompetent partner may share but fail to generate any benefits to be shared. As such, 
people are expected to independently track reputations in each domain. And in fact, 
Dominican laborers who depend on their neighbors for assistance in producing bay oil, 
do track willingness and ability separately (Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015). The value placed 
on generosity or competence also depends on the variation in available partners along 
these dimensions (Barclay, 2016b). For example, if potential partners are all similarly 
generous, then competence becomes more valued than generosity. Thus, willingness and 
ability to confer benefits, that is, character or competence, are expected to be important 
traits in partner selection. 
There is considerable evidence across populations that people prefer to interact 
with people who are generous and cooperative. In the US, when considering the ideal 
partner for a variety of relationships, people identify cooperative traits, such as 
trustworthiness and fairness, as being important (Cottrell et al., 2007; Goodwin et al., 
2014; Landy et al., 2016). When being observed, people will compete to be chosen as 
partners by being more cooperative, and cooperative people are in fact chosen more often 
as social partners (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). Among 
Dominican horticulturalists and Quechuan agropastoralists, people who have cooperative 
reputations have more social ties (Lyle & Smith, 2014; Macfarlan, Quinlan, & Remiker, 
2013; Macfarlan, Remiker, & Quinlan, 2012). And when the Martu foragers of Australia 
select hunting partners, they prefer to hunt with people who share more food, regardless 
of their actual hunting ability (Bliege Bird & Power, 2015; Bliege Bird, Scelza, Bird, & 
Smith, 2012). Across a number of societies, people preferentially interact with and help 
people perceived to have high character. 
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Less attention has been paid to the role of ability and productivity in preference 
for social partners, though some evidence exists that people prefer productive partners. 
For example, US participants prefer to continue relationships with productive partners, 
especially when productivity is indicative of future ability to generate benefits 
(Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). Even partners who are simply perceived to be more 
productive are preferred more as social partners (Eisenbruch et al., 2016). However, 
when choosing between generous or productive partners, people prioritize generosity 
partners (Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017; Raihani & Barclay, 2016). And in several non-
Western societies, productive people receive a number of social benefits. For example, 
among Aché forager-horticulturalists, productive hunters receive more food transfers 
when sick than less productive hunters (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000). In 
Dominican and Peruvian villages, people with reputations for being productive have 
more cooperative relationships (Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015). And in Hadza hunter-
gatherers, both men and women prefer good gatherers and hunters, respectively, as mates 
(Marlowe, 2004b). These results suggest that selection for productivity may have also 
been important in the evolution of human partner choice. 
The competition to gain access to valuable partners in some partner choice models 
can create a biological market, where there is agreement on who is most valued and the 
most valued partners can demand other valued partners (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). One 
important assumption is that there are benefits to being a desired partner. This affords 
more social opportunities, which could lead to greater access to resources, including 
food, coalitionary support in conflicts, and assistance when ill or injured, all of which 
could ultimately result in greater reproductive success. For example, being a good hunter 
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can lead directly to greater reproductive success by attaining more food, but being a good 
hunter can also indirectly lead to greater reproductive success because of better social 
partners that provide other benefits. For example, in the Agta and BaYaka foragers 
(Chaudhary et al., 2016; Page et al., 2017), people with more social ties receive more 
help, more food transfers, and have greater reproductive success.  
Alternatively, rather than competing to be valued by everyone, people may 
compete to be valued by a few select partners; specifically, those partners who value 
them above others. That is, people can form friendships (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1996). Whereas the biological market strategy is to be popular and valued by 
many, the friendship strategy is to be selective and discriminating with whom one 
interacts. Here, you would expect partners to reciprocate friendships. Consistent with 
this, among US college and online samples, people reciprocate friendship rankings 
among their best friends (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; DeScioli, Kurzban, Koch, & Liben-
Nowell, 2011). In the context of cooperation, cooperation can evolve when people seek 
out partners who cooperate specifically with them, even if they are uncooperative in 
general (Hruschka & Henrich, 2006). Thus, rather than preferring the most cooperative 
partners, friendship models predict that people should prefer partners who are specifically 
generous to them. In US samples, people more harshly judge a friend who is not generous 
to them but is generous to someone else compared to a friend who is not generous to 
anyone, including them (Barakzai & Shaw, 2018). And among Agta hunter-gatherers, 
people are more likely to share with people who share with them specifically rather than 
the most generous person (Daniel Smith et al., 2018). These studies suggest that 
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friendship pays off because it gives access to partners that value and invest in you 
specifically, rather than providing benefits promiscuously. 
The reviewed literature suggests that social selection and our ability to choose 
who to interact may have played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation. 
To compete for access to valuable cooperative partners, people must themselves be 
valuable partners. Partners can be valuable because they are willing to share benefits, are 
able to generate benefits, or because they reciprocate benefits to their partners 
specifically. Previous research provides evidence for partner choice for each of these 
ways. However, this research has been largely conducted in Western populations 
(Henrich et al., 2010) and in contexts not ecologically relevant for the evolution of human 
cooperation. Moreover, past studies do not consider all three types of value within a 
single study. 
In the current study, we examine the role of character, productivity, and 
reciprocity in partner choice among Hadza hunter-gatherers, whose way of life more 
closely approximates life before the advent of agriculture (Apicella & Barrett, 2016; 
Marlowe, 2005). In previous research using a behavioral measure of cooperation (i.e., 
one-shot public good game), cooperation did not seem to be an important criterion for 
choosing potential campmates among the Hadza. Hadza who contributed more in the 
public good game were not more likely to be nominated as potential campmates (Apicella 
et al., 2012). Moreover, Hadza who contributed more to the public good in a previous 
year did not live with more cooperative campmates in a future year (K. M. Smith et al., 
2018). And there also does not seem to a benefit to being a valued campmate; Hadza who 
were more often nominated as potential campmates did not have greater reproductive 
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success (Apicella et al., 2012). This set of findings are inconsistent with predictions from 
models of partner choice based on cooperation within a biological market. Instead, 
research suggests that Hadza prefer people with whom they have a ritual relationship 
(Hill et al., 2014). And preferences for future campmates are reciprocated within same-
sex networks (Apicella et al., 2012). These latter findings lend some preliminary support 
to friendship models of cooperation (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).  
There are a number of possibilities why previous research on Hadza campmate 
preferences failed to find a preference for cooperators. A possibility is that the economic 
game used does not reliably capture reputation as a cooperator. One reason could be 
because the game measures one narrow domain of cooperation among many in Hadza 
life, such as food sharing, childcare, and protection (Apicella & Crittenden, 2016). 
Another reason is that nominations included cross-camp networks and Hadza may not 
have up-to-date information about potential campmates’ cooperativeness, possibly 
because behavior changes faster than reputation spreads (Macfarlan et al., 2013). To 
address this concern, here we use informant rankings to measure perceptions of their 
campmates’ character, hunting ability (in men), and their preference for them as future 
campmates. We use these data to answer the following questions: 
1.      Do Hadza prefer campmates who they rank higher on character traits? 
2.      Do Hadza prefer male campmates who they rank higher on character traits 
or hunting reputation? 
3.      Are Hadza campmate preferences reciprocated? 
4.      Is being a preferred campmate or reciprocating relationships associated with 
greater reproductive success? 
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Method 
Population 
The Hadza are a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers living along the Central Rift 
Valley in northern Tanzania. There are approximately 1000 people who identify as 
Hadza, but only about 200 to 300 Hadza still obtain most of their calories via foraged 
foods and maintain a hunter-gatherer lifestyle (Marlowe, 2010). The Hadza have high 
rates of morbidity and mortality, and approximately 40% of children born will die before 
reaching the age of five (Blurton-Jones, 2016). Fresh water is scarce and hunger is a 
concern. Over 80% of Hadza report being concerned with having enough food to eat 
(Apicella, 2018). Hadza life is built on high levels of cooperation – food, protection, and 
childcare is shared (Crittenden & Marlowe, 2008).  
Hadza life is marked by a sexual division of labor where men spend time hunting 
and collecting honey and women spend time gathering food resources such as berries and 
tubers. Food, and in particular meat and items requiring extended processing (e.g., 
tubers), is widely shared among camp members (Marlowe, 2010), though producers may 
be able to direct some of the food to their kin (Wood & Marlowe, 2013). The Hadza have 
no formal status hierarchies, and Hadza are largely autonomous and able to make their 
own decisions.   
         The Hadza live in temporary camps of about 30 adults and children, typically 
consisting of a few unrelated nuclear families. Like most other hunter-gatherers, average 
relatedness within camps is low and Hadza live with only a few primary kin and have a 
multilocal resident pattern (Hill et al., 2011). Living arrangements are fluid. Entire camps 
shift locations every four to eight weeks in response to local resource availability. 
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Membership within camps also change regularly, with individuals or families freely 
relocating to other camps (Hill et al., 2014). In a longitudinal census across years, people 
on average were only living with about one in five of their campmates from previous 
years (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). This fluid social structure means the Hadza are regularly 
choosing new campmates to live with and can freely leave campmates they no longer 
want to live with. 
         The Hadza do not have formal sanctioning mechanisms for norm violations. 
Historically, the Hadza have had little to no interaction with authoritarian government 
institutions such as a police force, court system, or prisons. Though the Hadza do have 
beliefs in gods, they generally do not ascribe to them moralistic concerns or the ability to 
detect and punish transgressions (Apicella, 2018; Purzycki et al., 2016), though there is 
evidence this is changing. And in economic games, the Hadza have low rates of second- 
and third-party punishment (Henrich, 2006). These conditions—relying on campmates to 
cooperate, frequent movement and changing of campmates, and little threat of 
punishment—make the Hadza an ideal population to study the role of cooperative 
reputation in partner choice.   
Sample 
We visited 12 camps during the dry-season in August-September 2016 using a 
snowball sampling procedure; after visiting one camp, members of that camp would 
direct us toward the nearest camp. We collected data until we could not identify any more 
camps. The number of adults in each camp ranged from three to twelve. We had 95 
subjects ranked by their campmates for N = 730 observations. However, we removed two 
subjects with missing demographic information, and we removed two judges because 
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they refused to rank their campmates on honesty, insisting everyone lies. Another judge 
refused to rank more than two campmates on preferred future campmates. Our final 
sample had 93 subjects (n = 44 men; estimated age M = 39.9, SD = 14.5 years-old; n = 67 
married), ranked by 92 judges, for n = 683 observations. In analyses examining 
relationships with rankings of hunting ability, only men were ranked (see below). For 
those analyses, our sample had 42 male subjects (two men were the sole man in their 
respective camps and could not be ranked) being ranked by 84 subjects for n = 324 
observations. 
Procedures 
Upon entering a camp, we took photographs of each participating adult using a 
Fujifilm Instax Mini 90 Classic Instant Film Camera which printed 1.8 × 2.4 inch images. 
Photographs were headshots taken approximately 2 meters away against a grey photo 
screen. In separate interviews, a research assistant would shuffle the photographs of a 
judge’s campmates and randomly array the photographs in front of the judge. The 
interviewer then asked, “Who is the most generous?” After the judge chose a person in 
the array, the interviewer removed the person who was selected, picked up all the 
photographs, shuffled them, and arrayed them out again in front of the judge before 
repeating the question. This was repeated until all campmates were ranked. Judges also 
ranked themselves among their campmates on all dimensions except preferred campmate; 
however, because our research questions are about preferred campmates, we removed 
self-rankings and entered rankings as if the judges did not rank themselves. All 
interviews were conducted in Swahili by a Tanzanian research assistant and overseen by 
the first author. The Hadza have previous experience on this task and ranking their 
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campmates on hunting ability (Apicella, 2014; K. M. Smith et al., 2017; Stibbard-
Hawkes et al., 2018). 
 We asked participants to rank campmates on five traits. These were generosity 
(“Who is the most generous?”), effort (“Who works the hardest to get food?”), honesty, 
(“Who is the most honest?”), hunting ability, (“Who is the best hunter?”), and who they 
prefer to live with (“Who would you most like to live with if you were to move camp 
tomorrow?”). We asked every participant these questions in the same order. We chose to 
ask about generosity, effort, and honesty because previous interviews suggest these to be 
important character traits to the Hadza (Purzycki et al., 2018). For hunting ability, we 
asked men and women to rank only men on this trait. After participants ranked 
campmates on who they would like to live with we asked the participants to explain their 
relationship with each campmate. We classified a pair as kin only if both participants 
named each other as primary genetic kin (siblings or parent-child). 
 We collected data on demographic information in separate interviews. We asked 
participants whether they were married and estimated their age based on appearance. We 
asked each participant to list the names of all children born to them and then list the 
names of those who had died. These data were used to calculate reproductive histories.   
Data analysis and software 
We analyzed the data using multilevel Bayesian regression models. Bayesian 
analyses produce posterior distributions for parameters describing the likelihood that a 
particular value of the parameter would generate the observed data, conditional on the 
prior probability and assumptions within the model (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; 
McElreath, 2016). Our goal in the study was to estimate the relationship between 
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rankings on the various traits and describe the uncertainty around those estimates; 
Bayesian analyses provide a framework for quantifying these values in the posterior 
distributions (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). As such, we emphasize describing the 
posterior distributions rather than explicit hypothesis testing. We use multilevel models to 
better pool information across clusters, such as camps, subjects, and judges, and to 
address imbalances in sample sizes across clusters (McElreath, 2016). We used weakly 
regularizing priors; these are priors that are centered at zero and function to avoid 
overfitting to the data and improve computation (McElreath, 2016).  
 We conducted the analyses in R (R, 2017) using the ‘brms’ (Bürkner, 2017), and 
‘tidyverse’ (Wickham, 2017b) packages. The ‘brms’ package uses the programming 
language Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) to implement Monte Carlo Markov Chains to 
sample estimates from the posterior distribution. For Stan parameters, all models used 
one chain of 20,000 iterations, and 10,000 of those iterations were warmup, with a step 
parameter of δ = 0.90. 
Results 
Before inferential analyses, we first examined zero-order correlations between the 
rankings on character traits and preferred campmate. We computed correlations between 
each variable at the individual observation level, ignoring clustering within camps, 
subjects, and judges. All rankings were centered within camp. Table 3.1 presents the 
correlations. All variables were moderately correlated with each other at about the same 
range of values.  
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Table 3.1. Zero-Order Correlations Between Character and Preferred Campmate 
Rankings 
 Effort Generosity Honesty Hunting Preferred 
campmate 
Effort 1 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.25 
Generosity  1 0.27 0.17 0.23 
Honesty   1 0.22 0.23 
Hunting    1 0.29 
Preferred 
campmate 
    1 
Note. Values are Pearson’s rs. Hunting reputation only includes men being ranked.  
 
What character traits do Hadza prefer in campmates? 
We estimate the extent to which a judge’s perceptions of a campmate’s relative 
effort, generosity, and honesty relate to the judge’s preference for that person as a future 
campmate. To do this, we regressed ranking of preferred campmate on the rankings of the 
other traits using ordered logistic regressions. An ordered logistic regression assumes 
there is an unobserved parameter and a set of unobserved thresholds for each category or 
rank; as the parameter surpasses each threshold, the observed rank increases, such that 
the probability of having a higher rank increases as the parameter increases (McElreath, 
2016). The analysis assumes the parameter is a linear function of the variables in the 
model. 
Rankings on the character traits were centered within each camp so that a one-
rank change in any camp is relative to its median. Analyses included varying intercept 
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and slopes for all effects at the camp level, varying intercept and varying slopes for the 
character rankings at the subject level, and varying slopes for subject’s demographics and 
character rankings at the judge level. The priors for intercepts were normal distributions 
with μ = 0, σ = 2, the priors for coefficients were normal distributions with μ = 0, σ = 0.5, 
the priors for the standard deviations in varying effects were half-Cauchy distributions 
with μ = 0, σ = 0.5, and the priors for correlations between varying effects were LKJ 
correlation distributions with η = 4. 
We fit eight models predicting preferred campmate ranking from character 
reputation and demographics. The first model regressed preferred campmate ranking on 
subject demographics only; demographics were sex, age as a z-score, marital status, and 
whether the judge and participant were primary kin or spouse. The other models 
regressed preferred campmate ranking on one, two, or all of the character traits and 
demographics. Among the eight models, the full model with effort, generosity, honesty, 
and demographics was the best fitting model based on the widely-applicable information 
criterion (WAIC; see Table 3.2 for model comparisons). Using the WAIC, we calculated 
an Akaike weight for each model. The Akaike weight is the estimated probability that a 
model would best predict a new sample of data within the given set of models 
(McElreath, 2016). The full model had the entire Akaike weight and we consider only 
that model further.  
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Table 3.2. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character 
Rankings and Subject Demographics 
Model WAIC SEWAIC pWAIC Akaike weight 
Demographics 2999.98 27.96 94.01 0.00 
Effort 2964.81 32.10 129.57 0.00 
Generosity 2984.81 29.77 119.74 0.00 
Honesty 2972.37 29.97 126.95 0.00 
Effort + Generosity 2939.85 34.12 168.02 0.00 
Effort + Honesty 2937.57 33.32 170.30 0.00 
Generosity + 
Honesty 
2956.29 30.66 166.37 0.00 
Full 2889.27 34.56 223.01 1.00 
Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number 
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC 
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed 
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data 
among the considered models. 
 
Table 3.3 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the full model. There was 
good evidence that judges preferred older Hadza and their kin as campmates. There was 
also good evidence that judges preferred to live with Hadza they consider harder 
working, more generous, and more honest, and the strength of these relationships were 
approximately similar for all three character traits. To better understand the strength of 
these relationships, we simulated rankings on preferred campmate in the largest camp (11 
ranks) and computed the difference in preferred campmate ranking between being highest 
and lowest ranked on each character trait. The modal expected rank difference for effort 
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was 1.1 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.0, 2.5), for generosity was 1.2 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.1, 2.3), 
and for honesty was 1.6 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.5, 2.6). Figure 3.1 presents the rankings 
centered within camp as well as the regression line from the simulated predictions. We 
also simulated the probability that someone ranked highest on each character trait would 
be ranked at least one rank higher on preferred campmate than someone ranked lowest on 
that character trait. The modal probability for effort was 58.8% (90% HPDI: 43.3%, 
78.8%), for generosity was 60.2% (90% HPDI: 43.9%, 76.3%), and for honesty was 
68.0% (90% HPDI: 50.5%, 80.6%).  
Table 3.3. Full Model Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking on Character 
Rankings and Subject Demographics 
Coefficient b 90% HPDI % </> 0 
Effort 0.11 0.00 – 0.24 95.7 
Generosity 0.11 0.01 – 0.22 95.4 
Honesty 0.15 0.04 – 0.26 99.1 
Female -0.04 -0.52 – 0.36 60.2 
Married 0.21 -0.21 – 0.60 79.1 
Age 0.41 0.13 – 0.66 98.7 
Spouse 0.10 -0.39 – 0.61 65.7 
Kin 0.35 -0.10 – 0.80 90.3 
Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest 
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the 
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent 
of the posterior greater than (or less than in the case of Female) zero. 
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Figure 3.1. Ranking on preferred campmate by ranking on each character trait, centered 
within camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 values from an ordered 
logistic distribution for each ranking and the mean of these generated values were 
predicted ranking. The line is the mean simulated value and the shaded region is the 90% 
credible interval.   
 
Do Hadza prefer male campmates with better character or hunting reputation? 
We estimated the extent to which a judge’s perception of a male campmate’s 
character and his hunting ability relate to the judge’s preference for that man as a future 
campmate, again using ordered logistic regressions. We used the same priors and varying 
effects as the ones used in the section above. We fit four models predicting preferred 
campmate ranking from character traits, hunting ability, and demographics. The first 
model regressed preferred campmate ranking on subject demographics only; 
demographics were age as a z-score, marital status, and whether the judge and participant 
were primary kin or spouse. The other models were rankings on character traits and 
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demographics, hunting ability and demographics, and the full model with character traits, 
hunting ability, and demographics. Among the four models, the full model with character 
traits, hunting ability, and demographics was the best fitting model (see Table 3.4). The 
full model again has the full Akaike weight. 
Table 3.4. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character 
Traits, Hunting Ability, and Subject Demographics for Men 
Model WAIC SEWAIC pWAIC Akaike weight 
Demographics 1451.63 20.29 51.41 0.00 
Character traits 1424.09 25.34 109.35 0.00 
Hunting ability 1433.04 22.43 82.92 0.00 
Full 1381.94 27.47 153.84 1.00 
Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number 
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC 
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed 
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data 
among the considered models.  
 
Table 3.5 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the full model. There was 
good evidence that judges prefer men who are older and who are married more as 
campmates. There was also good evidence that judges preferred more generous men as 
campmates and little evidence that judges preferred hard working or honest men as 
campmates. We again simulated rankings on preferred campmate in the largest camp and 
computed the difference between being highest and lowest ranked on each character trait 
and hunting ability (we simulated eight ranks for hunting ability because the largest camp 
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had only eight hunters). The modal expected rank difference for effort was 0.8 ranks 
(90% HPDI: -1.0, 2.6), for generosity was 1.6 ranks (90% HPDI: -0.3, 3.0), for honesty 
was 0.8 ranks (90% HPDI: -1.1, 2.3), and for hunting was 2.4 ranks (90% HPDI: 0.4, 
4.2). Figure 3.2 presents the rankings centered within camp as well as the regression line 
from the simulated predictions. We again simulated the probability that someone ranked 
highest on each character trait would be ranked at least one rank higher on preferred 
campmate than someone ranked lowest on that character trait. The modal probability for 
effort was 55.3% (90% HPDI: 28.7%, 82.9%), for generosity was 70.4% (90% HPDI: 
42.8%, 88.3%), for honesty was 55.3% (90% HPDI: 27.5%, 78.3%), and for hunting was 
83.3% (90% HPDI: 51.5%, 95.9%).  
Table 3.5. Full Model Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking on Character 
Traits, Hunting and Subject Demographics for Men 
Coefficient b 90% HPDI % </> 0 
Effort 0.09 -0.10 – 0.28 78.8 
Generosity 0.15 -0.03 – 0.31 91.5 
Honesty 0.06 -0.11 – 0.23 73.6 
Hunting 0.34 0.04 – 0.63 96.7 
Married 0.53 -0.04 – 1.15 92.7 
Age 0.43 -0.08 – 0.81 90.9 
Spouse -0.06 -0.69 – 0.62 55.5 
Kin -0.02 -0.64 – 0.59 51.6 
Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest 
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the 
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent 
of the posterior greater than (or less than for Spouse and Kin) zero. 
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We also compared the difference in coefficient estimates across the posterior 
between hunting ability and each character trait. The modal difference between hunting 
ability and effort was Δb = 0.20 (90% HPDI: -0.11, 0.61; 86.2% Δb > 0), t between 
generosity was Δb = 0.18 (90% HPDI: -0.17, 0.52; 82.1% Δb > 0), and honesty was Δb = 
0.29 (90% HPDI: -0.08, 0.60; 89.9% Δb > 0). There was some evidence that judges had 
stronger preferences for hunting ability than character.
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Figure 3.2. Ranking on preferred campmate by ranking on each character trait and 
hunting ability, centered within camp. Predictions were simulated by generating 10,000 
values from an ordered logistic distribution for each ranking and the mean of these 
generated values were predicted ranking. The line is the mean simulated value and the 
shaded region is the 90% credible interval.   
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Do Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences? 
We next estimate to what extent Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. That 
is, do Hadza prefer to live with campmates who prefer to live with them? We use 
reciprocated campmate preferences as a proxy of friendship to test friendship models of 
partner choice. We computed for each judge-subject dyad whether their rankings were 
concordant (both ranked each other at or above median or both ranked each other at or 
below the median) or not. Of the all the dyads, only 58.9% mutually ranked each other 
above or below the median, suggesting there is not a lot of reciprocity in campmate 
preferences. Figure 3.3 plots ego’s ranking of alter and alter’s ranking of ego, with a line 
connecting each dyad. If there was reciprocity, the plot would have short lines clustering 
the diagonal; however, the long lines indicate little reciprocity. We also examined 
individual variation in the extent to which Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. We 
computed for each person a Kendall’s τ between ego’s rankings and their alters’ rankings. 
Figure 3.4 plots the histogram of these values. There was variation between Hadza in the 
extent to which they reciprocated campmate preferences; values ranged from -1 to 0.75. 
The median value was -0.05 and 50% of the values fell between -0.45 and 0.07. Only 
40.9% of the values were positive, again indicating there was little overall reciprocation 
in the population. 
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Figure 3.3. Plot of alter’s rank of ego by ego’s rank of alter. A line connects each dyad of 
ego and alter; reciprocity would be indicated by short lines near the diagonal. 
 
Figure 3.4. The distribution of each judge’s correlation between their ranking of alter and 
alters’ ranking of them using Kendall’s τ. The dashed line indicates the median. 
 
We estimated the extent to which campmate preferences are reciprocated by 
fitting two models using ordered logistic regressions. We regress rankings of campmate 
preferences and alter’s ranking of ego on campmate preferences with demographic 
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variables, and a second model that also included rankings on effort, generosity, and 
honesty. Priors and model details were the same as the first section on campmate 
preferences. We compare the two models to the full model from that section with all three 
character traits and demographics (here referred to as the character model). The character 
model with the reciprocal rankings was the best fitting model of the three; however, the 
Akaike weight was split between that model and the full model including the reciprocal 
rankings (see Table 3.6). We constructed a weighted-average posterior of the two models 
(McElreath, 2016) and analyze that posterior further.  
Table 3.6. Fit of Models Regressing Preferred Campmate Rankings on Character 
Traits, Reciprocal Rankings and Subject Demographics 
Model WAIC SEWAIC pWAIC Akaike weight 
Character 2889.27 34.56 223.01 0.20 
Reciprocal rankings 2991.48 28.52 117.98 0.00 
Full 2886.51 34.35 243.74 0.80 
Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number 
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC 
is the effective 
 
Table 3.7 presents the estimates from the weighted-average posterior. Again, 
there was good evidence that Hadza preferred older Hadza and their kin as campmates, 
and that Hadza prefer Hadza ranked higher on the character traits. However, there was 
little evidence that Hadza reciprocate campmate preferences. If there is a relationship 
between ego’s and alter’s rankings, it is likely smaller than the association between 
character rankings and campmate preferences. We compared the difference in coefficient 
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estimates across the posterior between each character ranking and the reciprocal ranking. 
The modal difference between effort and reciprocal ranking was Δb = 0.14 (90% HPDI: -
0.04, 0.29; 87.6% Δb > 0), the modal difference between generosity and reciprocal 
ranking was Δb = 0.10 (90% HPDI: -0.05, 0.27; 87.2% Δb > 0), and the modal difference 
between honesty and reciprocal ranking was Δb = 0.13 (90% HPDI: -0.03, 0.29; 92.4% 
Δb > 0).   
Table 3.7. Weighted-Average Posterior Regressing Preferred Campmate Ranking 
on Character Rankings, Reciprocal Rankings, and Subject Demographics 
Coefficient b 90% HPDI % </> 0 
Effort 0.12 0.00 – 0.25 95.8 
Generosity 0.12 0.00 – 0.23 95.5 
Honesty 0.15 0.04 – 0.25 98.6 
Reciprocal ranking 0.00 -0.11 – 0.13 46.3 
Female -0.05 -0.50 – 0.37 59.9 
Married 0.19 -0.19 – 0.62 79.9 
Age 0.42 0.13 – 0.69 98.5 
Spouse 0.13 -0.40 – 0.60 65.4 
Kin 0.35 -0.11 – 0.81 89.9 
Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest 
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the 
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent 
of the posterior greater than (or less than in the case of Female) zero. The distribution for 
Reciprocal ranking was bimodal, so a continuous HPDI was used.  
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Are there reproductive benefits to being a valued partner? 
We estimate to what extent character reputation, being a preferred campmate, and 
reciprocating campmate preferences are associated with reproductive success. We 
computed a mean rank for each character trait and being a preferred campmate using the 
camp-centered ranks, and we used the Kendall’s τ computed in the above section as a 
measure of reciprocated campmate preferences. We regressed subjects’ number of living 
children on demographic variables (excluding age, see below), character reputation, 
desirability as a campmate, and tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences using a 
Poisson regression with a log link-function. A Poisson regression is a count regression 
that estimates the rate of an event or observation over time and space (McElreath, 2016). 
An important assumption is that the exposure time is constant across participants, and 
older Hadza have more reproductive opportunities. To address this, we add age as a 
constant offset, taking the logarithm of participant’s age – 15, and for women, a max 
value of logarithm of 30 (max age 45) to reflect the reproductive window for Hadza 
(Blurton-Jones, 2016). Analyses included varying intercepts and slopes for each effect at 
the camp level. The priors for the intercepts were normal distributions with μ = 2, σ = 1, 
the priors for coefficients were normal distributions with μ = 0, σ = 1.5, the priors for the 
standard deviations in varying effects were half-Cauchy distributions with μ = 0, σ = 0.6, 
and the priors for correlations between varying effects were LKJ correlation distributions 
with η = 4. The step parameter was increased to δ = 0.95 to avoid divergent transitions 
during sampling (Carpenter et al., 2017). 
We fit six models predicting number of living children from demographic 
variables, character reputation, desirability as a campmate, and tendency to reciprocate 
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campmate preferences. The demographics model included sex, marital status, and an 
interaction between sex and marital status. The character model included demographics 
and the mean rankings on effort, generosity, and honesty. The preferred campmate model 
included demographics and the mean ranking on being a preferred campmate. The 
reciprocated ranking model included tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences and 
demographics. The social selection model included mean ranking on being a preferred 
campmate, tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences, and demographics. Finally, 
the full model included mean rankings on effort, generosity, honesty, and being a 
preferred campmate, and tendency to reciprocate campmate preferences, and 
demographics. The demographics only model was the best fitting model (see Table 3.8). 
However, the Akaike weight is split between all the models, particularly those that do not 
include character rankings. We construct a weighted-average posterior from the other 
four models and examine that posterior further.   
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Table 3.8. Fit of Models Number of Living Children on Character, Preferred 
Campmate, and Reciprocated Rankings 
Model WAIC SEWAIC pWAIC Akaike weight 
Demographics 326.65 12.16 9.24 0.54 
Character traits 332.77 11.92 13.71 0.03 
Preferred campmate 329.32 12.08 10.45 0.14 
Reciprocated rankings 328.28 12.13 10.32 0.24 
Social selection 331.13 12.11 11.61 0.06 
Full 336.83 12.02 15.92 0.00 
Note. WAIC is the widely-applicable information criterion estimate; a lower number 
indicates a better fitting model. SEWAIC is the standard error of the WAIC estimate, pWAIC 
is the effective number of parameters in the model, and the Akaike weight is computed 
from WAIC and is the probability that the model will best predict a new set of data 
among the considered models; the weights do not add up to 1 because of rounding.  
 
Table 3.9 presents the estimates for the coefficients in the average-weighted 
model. There was strong evidence that demographic variables relate to reproductive 
success; being a woman or married was associated with more living children, though the 
effect of marriage was much smaller for women than men. There was little evidence that 
being a more preferred campmate was associated with more living children (see Figure 
3.5) or that have more reciprocated rankings was associated with more living children 
(see Figure 3.6).  
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Table 3.9. Weighted-Average Posterior Regressing Number of Living Children on 
Preferred Campmate Ranking, Reciprocated Rankings, and Demographics 
Coefficient b 90% HPDI % </> 0 
Intercept -2.65 -3.05 – -2.17 100 
Female 0.84 0.35 – 1.35 99.9 
Married 0.72 0.30 – 1.20 99.9 
Female × Married -0.76 -1.32 – -0.23 99.8 
Preferred campmate 0.00 -0.05 – 0.04 8.8 
Reciprocated rankings 0.00 -0.11 – 0.27 18.6 
Note. The coefficient estimate is the mode of the posterior distribution. The 90% highest 
posterior density interval (HPDI) is the narrowest interval containing 90% of the 
posterior, or the 90% most plausible coefficient estimates. The last column is the percent 
of the posterior greater than (or less than for Intercept and Female × Married) zero. The 
distributions for Preferred campmate and Reciprocated ranking were bimodal and a 
continuous HPDI was used.  
 
Figure 3.5. Number of living children by mean preferred campmate ranking. The line is 
the regression line from the median of the weighted-average posterior, and the shaded 
region is the 90% credible interval.  
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Figure 3.6. Number of living children by the correlation between ego’s and alters’ 
rankings. The line is the regression line from the median of the weighted-average 
posterior, and the shaded region is the 90% credible interval.  
 
Discussion 
Group living affords many advantages including the establishment of mutually 
beneficial exchange partners that can increase individual reproductive success. Yet, little 
work has examined the relative value of various traits in preferences for non-reproductive 
(i.e. social) partners in populations relevant for the setting of human evolution. Nor has 
work examined whether preferred partners gain reproductive benefits from being in high 
demand.  
         Here, we explored the determinants of partner choice among the Hadza, 
examining the role character, productivity, and reciprocity play in campmate preferences. 
We found positive, but arguably weak, associations between evaluations of effort, 
generosity, and honesty and being a preferred campmate. Instead, the evidence suggests 
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that hunting ability is more important than character when choosing male campmates, 
suggesting that productivity outweighs character when selecting social partners. Contrary 
to prior research, we also found little evidence to suggest that Hadza reciprocate 
campmate preferences. Finally, there was little evidence to suggest that being a desirable 
campmate or having stronger reciprocal relationships is associated with greater 
reproductive success. Together, these results suggest that preference for more cooperative 
partners do not play a role in maintaining cooperation among the Hadza. 
 The expected strength of the relationship between character traits and being a 
preferred campmate should be evaluated relative to the investment cost of improving 
one’s relative reputation as a social partner and the benefits of being a preferred 
campmate. Our results provide little evidence that being a desired campmate is associated 
with greater reproductive success and suggests desirable partners receive few benefits. 
And though we do not have direct evidence of the costs of improving one’s reputation, 
there is other evidence to suggest that it is often difficult—and thus costly—to reliably 
improve one’s reputation. For example, hunting reputation only loosely tracks hunting 
ability and can only reliably distinguish the best hunters from the worst hunters 
(Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). And among Dominican laborers, character reputation 
tends to be slow changing relative to changes in behavior (Macfarlan et al., 2013). That 
is, reputation is noisy relative to actual behavior, and changes in behavior do not 
guarantee changes in one’s reputation. The high costs of increasing one’s reputation and 
the low benefits of being a preferred campmate suggests that the associations observed 
here are too small for partner choice to be a viable mechanism for maintaining 
cooperation. 
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However, it is not the case that the Hadza have no preferences for campmates. 
There was evidence that perception of hunting ability was an important criterion for 
campmates. This finding is consistent with prior research showing that Hadza men prefer 
to live in hypothetical camps with better hunters (Wood, 2006). Moreover, individuals 
with traits associated with greater health, which may indicate better productivity, such as 
height, muscle mass, body fat were positively, were more likely to be nominated as future 
campmates (Apicella et al., 2012). However, the current results suggest there is little 
benefit to reproductive success by being a preferred campmate. This suggests there is no 
incentive for Hadza men to hunt to attain access to valuable social partners (Hawkes, 
1993), and previous associations between hunting reputation and reproductive success in 
the Hadza (Apicella, 2014) may have been due to direct benefits provided to spouse and 
children (Wood & Marlowe, 2013), and/or access to higher quality mates (Hawkes, 
1991). 
There are three key limitations to the current study. First, we only examined three 
character traits: effort, generosity, and honesty. We chose these traits because they were 
previously identified by the Hadza as being morally relevant (Purzycki et al., 2018), and 
all involve putting someone else’s welfare before one’s own. However, there may be 
other character traits that Hadza believe are more important in campmates. Second, the 
rankings were within camp and there may be a limited range within the camp to estimate 
the association between perceptions of character and who is a preferred campmate or 
between who is a preferred campmate and reproductive success. However, given that 
these results are corroborated using between camp methods (Apicella et al., 2012; K. M. 
Smith et al., 2018), this may not be a problem in our data. Third, the analyses are 
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correlational, which may be particularly problematic for analyses of reproductive success. 
It could be that an unobserved variable is suppressing the relationships between being a 
preferred campmate and reproductive success.   
 A basic rule for the evolution of cooperation is that cooperation must “cluster,” 
with the benefits of cooperation preferentially flowing to other cooperators (Wilson & 
Dugatkin, 1997), and previous research among the Hadza has found that cooperation does 
indeed cluster within camps (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Given the fluidity of hunter-
gatherer groups and the flexibility of who hunter-gatherers can live with, one might 
expect partner choice for cooperation to be an important way to maintain clustering. 
However, a number of findings present difficulties to this hypothesis. First, for partner 
choice to be a viable strategy, current willingness to cooperate must reliably indicate 
future willingness to cooperate. However, among the Hadza, willingness to cooperate is 
not stable and instead changes to adopt to local norms (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Second, 
people must prefer more cooperative partners. The results presented here suggest such 
preferences are weak, and other studies have failed to find an association between 
generosity in economic games and having more social ties in the Hadza (Apicella et al., 
2012). And when actual living patterns are observed, cooperation in previous years does 
not predict more cooperative partners in future years (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Third, 
being a preferred partner should be associated with greater reproductive success. The 
results here and previous results with the Hadza (Apicella et al., 2012) and the Batek 
foragers of Central Africa (Kraft, Venkataraman, Tacey, Dominy, & Endicott, 2018). 
These results are inconsistent with partner choice models of cooperation, and suggest that 
partner choice does not maintain cooperation in hunter-gatherer groups. 
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 Why would the Hadza not have stronger preferences for more cooperative 
campmates? An important assumption in partner choice models is that there is 
meaningful variation along the dimensions of cooperativeness and productivity for which 
to choose partners based on. When there is reduced variability on one dimension, the 
other dimension becomes more important in partner choice decisions (Barclay, 2016b). 
And without variation, then people are interchangeable along that dimension and the 
threat of exiting the relationship provides no incentive for partners to cooperate.  
One possibility is that strong norms of egalitarianism govern cooperative behavior 
in hunter-gatherers (Cashdan, 1980), which reduces variation in cooperative behavior as 
people conform to the local norms (K. M. Smith et al., 2018). Another possibility is that 
populations from small-scale societies have behavioral variation. For example, the 
Tsimané  of Bolivia have fewer personality traits and vary less upon those dimension 
compared to university samples (Gurven et al., 2013). And across societies, populations 
with access to fewer economic niches have less behavioral variation than Western 
societies (Lukaszewski et al., 2017). One explanation is that more economic opportunities 
allows for more behavioral variation and encourages individuation to fill those niches 
(Gurven, 2018; Smaldino, Lukaszewski, von Rueden, & Gurven, 2018). In population 
likes the Hadza with no economic specialization, there is little room for behavioral 
variation, including variation on cooperative behavior. As a result, there is no compete on 
being cooperative partner. 
Our results suggest that the Hadza do not choose partners based on cooperation. 
Rather, a campmates’ ability to produce benefits in the first place play a more important 
role in how Hadza choose campmates. We argue that social selection for cooperative 
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partners is unlikely to have played a major role in the evolution of human cooperation 
and that social selection for productive partners may have played a larger role in shaping 
human partner choice decisions. 
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